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CULTURAL LITERACY AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM: THE ENDURING PROBLEMS OF
DISTRUST, MISUNDERSTANDING, AND
NARROW PERSPECTIVE
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL
I. INTRODUCTION
My six-year-old son's current vocational ambition is to play professional
hockey. A budding masochist, he aspires to join the New Jersey Devils.
Knowing all too well the athletic limits of his paternal gene pool, I have tried
to steer him toward more cerebral and less physical endeavors. Consequently,
I was an easy mark when his school's fundraising book sale offered E.D.
Hirsch's Wat Your 2nd Grader Needs to Know' among its selections. Yes,
Hirsch, who authored the bestseller Cultural Literacy,2 has brought his
educational agenda to the elementary level. The "cultural literacy" series,
which includes similar volumes for other grades, operates on the principle that
effective critical thinking cannot occur in a vacuum but requires that those doing
the thinking, debating, discussing, arguing, governing, etc., possess a core of
factual knowledge upon which to base their analyses. For example, adults
should know basic facts about American history, including the approximate dates
of important events, while children should not only know the mechanics of
reading and arithmetic, but also rudimentary history and at least the gist of some
literary classics.3
According to Hirsch and his collaborators,4 one of the classic parables that
even young children should know is the tale of the Blind Men and the Elephant.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to David Herr, to my colleagues teaching
civil procedure at Brooklyn Law, and to the members of the Committees on Federal Courts of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the New York County Lawyer's Association, and
the Federal Bar Council, who keep me thinking about issues of adversarialism and litigation from
what I hope is a reasonably broad perspective. Work underlying this essay was supported by a
Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend. Although I have been active in bar association
commentary on proposed litigation reform, the views in this essay are solely my own.
1. E.D. HIRSCH, JR., WHAT YOUR 2ND GRADER NEEDS To KNOW (1991).
2. E.D. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW
(1987).
3. See HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 1-5.
4. In response to criticisms suggesting that his approach is hierarchal and privileging of an
established elite, Hirsch takes some pains to explain the process of enlisting scores of educators in
distilling his core of "must know" information. See HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 5-7.
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Having somehow attained adulthood in ignorance of the "textbook" version of
the story, my attention was drawn to the simple, didactic, frequently paraphrased
tale. According to Hirsch's version:
There were once six blind men who went to see an elephant. The
first blind man stretched his hands in front of him and felt the animal's
huge side. "This elephant is like a high strong wall," he announced.
The second man, who was standing near the elephant's head, put
his hand on its long, sharp tusk. "A wall? NO! I would say that it
is more like a spear."
The third man reached around the elephant's leg with both arms.
"I hate to contradict you," he said, "but I am sure that the elephant is
very like a tree."
The fourth man happened to reach up and touch the elephant's
ear. "All of you are mistaken," he said. "The elephant is actually
similar to a fan." The fifth man was standing by himself at the
elephant's other end. He happened to grab the animal's tail. "I don't
understand the confusion," he said. "I am sure I am correct in saying
that the elephant is much like a rope."
Now the elephant was a bit playful, so he tickled the sixth man
with his trunk. The startled man pushed the trunk away and said with
a shudder, "Please stay calm while I swear to you that the elephant is
really a very large snake!"
"Nonsense!" said the others. Still, they quietly began to move
away, and they never bothered to put their heads together to
understand what the elephant was really like.5
Although I have some misgivings about making six disabled persons an
illustration of human cognitive failing, the parable nonetheless provides more
insight than political incorrectness. 6 In addition, the sighted world of civil
litigation reform continues to provide vivid evidence that distrust among
segments of the legal profession, misunderstanding, particularly about the
adversary system, and narrowness of perspective are hardly restricted to any
particular group. Like the six blind men, different elements of the legal
profession and the American body politic have consistently approached the issue
of litigation reform with cognitive tunnel vision, failing, among other things, to
appreciate the practical import of the adversarial model of civil disputing.
5. HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 20-21.
6. The tale has, however, an underlying but probablyunintentionalmodernity. Afterall, itwas
a group of six men who so abysmally failed to collaborate. Many readers probably assume that a
group of six women would never be so isolated in their investigation. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
As a result, reform efforts are likely to accomplish little and may even
result in a net diminution of a civil litigation system that, for all its inarguable
failings, has functioned well in the role in which society has cast it.7 In
particular, I suspect that many of the "expense and delay reduction plans"
resulting from the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act' and current proposed
amendments to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
now under consideration by the Supreme Court9 will bring greater transaction
costs and some shift in the relative power of certain litigants, but not the
streamlined litigation sought by the revisors.
The meandering road to discovery reform illustrates, among other things,
the ineffectiveness of an atomized profession that lacks either sufficient
understanding of the adversary system or the resources and forcefulness to
address the practical impact of adversarialism. In some ways, lawyers
reforming litigation can be characterized as poorer investigators than the sixsome
who examined the elephant. The -elephant sleuths were guilty of isolation and
ignorance. Lawyers and policymakers not only exhibit a lack of information and
empathy, but also often show an unwarranted distrust of or contempt for the
elements of the profession with which they disagree. Unfortunately, however,
the distrust is often earned.
In raising these concerns, I make rather elastic use of the now popularized
7. Powerful recent academic criticism less tentative than my own concludes that recent litigation
developments like the proliferation of local rules and the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act have gutted
much of what was good in civil litigation while creating substantial new problems. See, e.g., Linda
S. Mullenix, 7he Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992); Carl
Tobias, civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1393 (1993).
8. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 11 1990) (hereinafter "CJRA" or "Biden Bill," after Sen. Joseph Biden
(D-Del.), its principal sponsor) requires that all federal district courts implement a "civil justice
expense and delay reduction plan" designed to speed case processing. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp.
II 1990). For a review of common features of delay reduction plans, see Report of the Task Force
on the Civil Justice Reform Act, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Brad D. Brian & Richard McMillan, Jr.,
eds.); Mullenix, supra note 7, at 385-406; Tobias, supra note 7, at 10-30.
9. The current package of proposed amendments establishes a regime of "disclosure" of basic
information by the parties at the outset of litigation where claims are pleaded "with particularity"
and of expert information disclosure prior to trial. In addition, presumptive limits of 25
interrogatories and 10 depositions are established, subject to change by court order. The discovery
package also provides for increased "meet-and-confer" obligations of counsel and a more stringent
duty of supplementation as well as specifying in greater detail the obligations of counsel regarding
support for claims of privilege and the permissible scope of objections at depositions. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS (Sept. 22, 1992); ALI-ABA, NEw DIRECTIONS IN
FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Jan. 21, 1993). Part IV, infra, discusses what I regard
as the more problematic changes.
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"cultural literacy" term to mean: (1) basic knowledge; (2) understanding of
legal cultures or subcultures such as the "culture" of trial lawyer customs; and
(3) tolerance among legal subcultures such as the degree of cooperation among
the bench, the bar, Congress, and the executive.'0 In my view, the profession's
frequent lack of such cultural literacy undermines both the operation and reform
of civil litigation. Part II of this Essay sketches the major forces of legal
policymaking (I have avoided the temptation to divide the field .into six
categories, although the points of demarcation are somewhat malleable.). Part
III reviews the profession's enduring and disturbing tendency to pursue change
despite relatively scanty information. Part IV discusses the pending changes in
discovery, concluding that this packet of rule revisions reflects all too well the
problem of insufficient cultural literacy with regard to the adversary system.
II. DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE ELEPHANT: THE VARIEGATED AND
SHORT-SIGHTED PERSPECTIVES AND AGENDAS OF THE LAW
AND POLICY ESTABLISHMENT
A. The Bench
Since adoption of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and probably well before,
judges have been first among equals in the arena of civil litigation reform.
Although recent congressional activity, such as passage of the 1990 Civil Justice
Reform Act" in which proponents self-consciously chose not to consult sitting
judges before introducing the bill, probably reflects a shift in rulemaking power
away from the judicial hegemony of the 1934-1970 period, 2 judges continue to
enjoy a favored position. Typical changes in civil litigation practice begin with
amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, which usually begin with the Advisory
Committee discussing a possible amendment, agreeing upon a trial draft,
circulating it informally, revising it, and publishing the draft for public
comment. The Committee next determines whether to forward a proposed
amended rule to a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
which also oversees developments from Advisory Committees on the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Bankruptcy, and, beginning soon, Evidence; and then to
10. Although non-lawyer officials, clients, interest groups, and politicians are not part of the
legal profession proper, I include them to the extent they are involved in legal policymaking.
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990). See supra note 8.
12. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 377. The CJRA "is fomenting a nationwide procedural
revolution that is probably unparalleled since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938." Id. The CJRA "has effected a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking
power from the federal judicial branch to the legislative branch." Id. at 279.
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the Judicial Conference of the United States. 3 If the Judicial Conference
approves a proposed amendment, it is forwarded to the U.S. Supreme Court.
After non-public deliberation and consideration, the Court determines whether
to promulgate the proposed change. If the Court makes timely issuance of a
new rule, the amended rule automatically takes effect six months later unless
Congress intervenes. 4
Although the bench does not have the official "last word" on rulemaking,
it has the first word and the most words. As a practical matter, the bench
shapes litigation rules and is ordinarily stymied in rulemaking only when
Congress strongly disagrees.' 5 Of course, individual trial courts and judges
retain considerable power even when not victorious in the rulemaking process.
District courts are permitted to enact local rules, 6 a power whose exercise
exploded during the 1970-1990 period. By one count, there were more than
5000 local rules, many of them arguably inconsistent with the actual "national"
rules but nonetheless continuing in apparent full effect. 7 During the past
fifteen years, individual judges have further balkanized"5 the structure of
litigation rules by entering "standing orders" governing litigation practice in
their courtrooms. Standing orders ordinarily address the technical details of
litigation: length of memoranda and briefs; timetables; format of motions and
other submissions; use of witnesses; and so on. Nonetheless, standing orders
can often look suspiciously like local rules, which often look suspiciously like
revisions of the "real" national civil rules.
13. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, codified as amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74. For a
comprehensive examination of the Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). The Judicial Conference is comprised of the Chief Justice, the
chief judge of each federal circuit court of appeals and a selected district judge, as well as the chief
judge of the Court of International Trade. It meets periodically to consider possible changes in
federal rules (criminal, evidence, bankruptcy, and appellate, as well as civil), meetings at which the
Chief Justice presides. For a description of recent rulemaking activity by the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, see Hon. Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK.
L. REv. 263 (1992).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988).
15. But see Mullenix, supra note 7 (suggesting that the judiciary is now clearly subservient to
Congress and other interests in setting the tone of federal civil procedure).
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
17. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT (Final Draft Apr. 1989); Tobias, supra note 7, at 5-7.
18. In a disturbing instance of serendipity, several scholars have independently found a
metaphor of political and social disintegration (as exemplified in the pejorative "balkanize") to
adequately characterize the emerging new world of civil litigation. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at
382; Tobias, supra note 7 (passim). See also Mullenix, supra note 7, at 381 n.22 (in congressional
hearing testimony, Professor Maurice Rosenberg described the situation as a "Tower of Babel").
Professor Tobias defines balkanization as the "fragmentation of federal civil procedure, which is
manifested more specifically in the increasingly disuniform and complex nature of the procedural
system."
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The almost cancerous growth of local rules and standing orders provides
an example of the bench's ability to overlook the concerns of lawyers and
litigants. Although not an issue of the adversary system as such, insensitivity
to lawyers and clients is emblematic of a larger problem. Local and individual
judicial action undermines uniformity, requiring counsel to become conversant
with additional regulations. This takes time and raises costs. Clients usually
pay the tab. Although that tab is perhaps not steep in each case, the cumulative
cost is probably significant. Judges undoubtedly would respond that this cost is
outweighed by the reduced costs to judges that result when counsel present their
cases in a consistent manner more digestible to the presiding judge. I suspect,
however, that judicial myopia has misread the cost-benefit analysis.
For example, even if a reasonably busy trial judge receives only twenty
new cases per month but has a detailed standing order prescribing only motion
format, this will prompt some increase in costs: half the cases will have
motions, and movant's counsel will need to spend some time ensuring that the
motion complies with the standing order. Even if only thirty minutes are
required and the average billing rate of counsel is $100 per hour, the minor but
idiosyncratic provision generates approximately $500 per month in additional
counsel fees. 9 During the judge's tenure, tens of thousands of dollars of
additional counsel time are charged so that the judge may receive motions in the
format he or she desires. Does this uniformity save judicial resources?
Thousands of dollars of judicial resources?" I am skeptical.
The bench's willingness to force private parties to internalize costs in order
to provide a benefit to the court recurs frequently in civil litigation. The final
pretrial order is a useful tool for focusing counsel upon a pending case and
provides the judge with a ready roadmap of the trial, undoubtedly improving the
court's conduct of the enterprise. Usually, courts require counsel to collaborate
on the pretrial order. However, many judges have labyrinth-like format
requirements for the pretrial order (for example, requiring color-coding of
19. These estimates are extremely conservative. In larger law firms, the compliance review
will probably be foisted upon new associates, who will need more time to read the order and
interpret it, perhaps taking the time of other colleagues for consultation. If more experienced
lawyers are involved, the billing rate increases. According to recent reports, the average billing rate
for relatively inexperienced lawyers even in small communities is $100 per hour. In addition, I am
assuming a narrow and not terribly picayune standing order. Many are not.
20. Of course, measuring the value of judicial time is difficult because judges do not
(thankfully) bill the government by the hour. The savings, if any, from a court's streamlined
reading of motions are particularly difficult to calculate. One must assume that the judge saves some
time and uses it to render either more decisions, better decisions, or faster decisions and that these
improvements either obviate the need to appoint additional judges or result in tangible economic
gains to the litigants through having their cases heard faster or decided better. If the judge uses
additional time for leisure, professional development, or (brace yourself) civil rules revision, the
purported benefits of the hypothetical standing order become even more problematic to estimate.
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different contents), making its preparation a more costly and time-consuming
task. Although the picayune pretrial order may increase incentives to settle, this
has never been systematically studied, much less empirically confirmed.2" If
the "settlement-enhancement" premise is anything short of correct, overly
micro-managed pretrial orders only serve to increase legal fees and litigation
costs by more than they can ever conserve judicial resources.
Of course, this is true of any "settlement enhancement" practice. If the
case fails to settle, the settlement enhancement procedures have added to the
costs of the case. However, the common methods for encouraging settlements,
such as conferences with the court, summary jury trials, mini-trials, and early
neutral evaluation, do appear, according to the comments of participants, to
achieve tangible success in prompting settlement. Whether the savings from an
increase in settlements (both more settlements and faster settlements) outweigh
the costs of court resources invested in settlements and possible "justice
costs"' resulting from settlements is a more difficult inquiry.
Motion hearings provide another example of the bench valuing its resources
while largely ignoring those of litigants and lawyers. Many, perhaps most,
district and magistrate judges routinely hold motion hearings in the "cattle call"
format, in which all movants scheduled for the court's motion day are assigned
the same time. Obviously, not all are heard at the same time. Rather, motions
are heard seriatim, but all lawyers are required to be present from the
beginning. Some lawyers consequently do not begin to present their positions
at the 9:00 a.m. hearings until noon or afterward in many courts. A little
21. Professor Rosenberg's noted study concluded that pretrial conferences aided case disposition
but did not suggest that elaborate conferences, standing orders, or other procedures were necessary
to achieve this effect. See MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & EFFECTIVE
JUSTICE (1964). In my view, too enlardened a conference system (or any case management system)
not only fails to further the efficiency but actually impedes it.
22. By justice costs, I mean primarily the possibility that by pushing settlement of a case that
would otherwise be tried, the court achieves an outcome distinctly worse than at least one party
would achieve if the case were litigated and that society cares about this party's loss. So long as
the court's "pushing" did not become overly coercive, counsel and client are still free to refuse to
settle. Thus, in many cases, society simply should not care that a litigant settled a case it should
have tried, even if the court prompted the settlement. Where the court's arm-twisting was too great,
however, society should care. Society should also care when even relatively benign judicial
prompting results in unfair settlements by poorer, less sophisticated, or less well-represented
litigants.
A related justice cost occurs when an individual case is settled equitably but the judicial system
and society arguably lose something because the settlement creates salient costs to those outside the
litigation, as may occur in some cases where the settlement is confidential, evidence is lost, or the
judiciary fails to make an authoritative statement about the matter in dispute. See Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For And Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485
(1985).
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calculation suggests this may be a significant addition to the cost of litigation.
In a given morning of motion hearings, a courtroom packed with twenty to thirty
lawyers, three-fourths of whom bill by the hour,' with gradual exit by counsel
as motions are heard, probably produces at least $5000 in counsel fees.24 This
figure could be significantly reduced if judges respected counsels' time as much
as the court's own and assigned motion hearings with specific times, such as in
ten to fifteen minute intervals, in order to minimize lawyer waiting time. At
most, the court might incur a few moments of silence should a matter end early
or the ensuing lawyer be late. 2
Of course, the typical court's focus upon its own efficiency in derogation
of others is only unfortunate human nature.' And court inefficiencies result
in a relatively small portion of litigation costs in the average case: only a slight
percentage of counsel's billable time, is spent waiting in court,27 complying with
23. 1 am assuming that half the cases are commercial disputes with counsel billing on an hourly
basis. The other half of the cases are assumed to be personal injury, civil rights, or some other type
in which the plaintiff's counsel (but not defense counsel) does not bill hourly, although some counsel
may ultimately submit claims for the time at the motion hearing if fee-shifting is permitted, as in a
successful Title VII employment discrimination case. On the temptations for excessive billing when
using the hourly fee method, see William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing By Attorneys, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991).
24. Conservatively, I estimate $100 per hour billing and that each hour reduces the 25-attorney
crowd by approximately eight lawyers. Although many of the lawyers waiting their turn may work
on other matters for other clients, they will probably "double-bill" the clients rather than reduce
charges for the client paying for waiting time. If the waiting lawyer can productively do some other
work for the client paying waiting time, this will reduce somewhat the amount of wasted fees.
25. At least one source has estimated that judicial resources cost the public $600 per hour. See
A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219,
227 (1985). However, many of the costs comprising that figure are sunk costs entailed in providing
physical structure and support for the court and assembling a basic staff. Each additional minute
of judicial "down time" does not necessarily result in $10 of out-of-pocket loss to taxpayers (or
buyers of Treasury bills, notes, and bonds that finance the national debt). Even if it did, that cost
is equalled or exceeded when traded off against cumulative counsel time wasted in a multi-party
case, as in the case of the motion hearing cattle call, where a roomful of lawyers is forced to wait,
or one in which counsel are expensive. For example, Cravath, Swaine & Moore charged the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation approximately $600 per hour for the time of some partners
in a modified contingency fee arrangement in pursuing claims arising out of the savings and loan
debacle.
26. But as applied to judicial policymaking, it can have a powerful effect. See Edward Brunet,
The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV.
LITIG. 273 (1991) (concluding that interests of efficient case processing, measured primarily from
the vantage point of the judiciary, and judicial discretion were pre-eminent in modern efforts to
revise procedures for administering complex civil litigation).
27. Although citing billable hours provides an easier illustration of my point, contingency fee
counsel are not costless. If successful, they will take a big chunk, usually one-third, of the client's
recovery. Presuming a relatively efficient market for contingent fee legal services, it is not far-
fetched to presume that the going contingency fee rate of 33 % has factored into it the inefficiencies
of practicing law, including waiting time, compliance with standing orders, local rules, and the like.
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local rules, or preparing a pretrial order as compared to meeting with clients and
witnesses, conducting discovery, researching law, developing strategies, drafting
papers, and otherwise preparing the case in the office or in the field.
Cumulatively, however, the costs of lawyer inefficiency to ease matters for the
court probably total millions of dollars. Although easing things for the judge
undoubtedly provides some benefit, I am not at all confident that society comes
out ahead on the exchange.2
Narrow focus is not an affliction affecting only judge-lawyer relations.
Judges occasionally seem out of touch with the obstacles faced by other judges.
For example, a particularly insightful appellate judge, Stephen Reinhardt of the
Ninth Circuit, recently argued persuasively that the number of federal appellate
judges should be doubled from 160 to 320. 2' He suggested that this would not
necessarily double case dispositions, because doubling the appeals bench would
also provide improved quality, as circuit judges would be permitted more time
to reflect upon each case. However, in addressing problems with his proposal,
Judge Reinhardt mused that a similar doubling of district court judgeships
seemed in order, but that this would consequently double the number of district
cases from which appeal is taken.' Painfully aware of his own harried
workload and the attendant temptation to cut intellectual comers, Judge
Reinhardt seems to assume that district judges would use additional resources
solely to churn out more case dispositions rather than investing more intellectual
capital into trial court decisionmaking.3"
To the extent that these logistical costs were widely reduced, one would expect some reduction in
the contingency fee percentage absent other factors.
28. Judicial capacity to overlook the concerns of the private bar extends to even architectural
matters that probably seem trivial to nonlawyers. For example, a new federal courthouse planned
for Manhattan is to provide large and comfortable quarters for judges and staff as well as courtside
private conference rooms ("war rooms" in the jargon of the trade) for use of the United States
Attorney's office in trying its cases, but makes no similar provision of war rooms for private
counsel.
New York lawyers are justifiably puzzled, disappointed, and even outraged about the
oversight. They may go to trial infrequently, but when they do it is often for several weeks with
file cabinets full of documents and a small army of witnesses. I view it as unfortunately too typical
of bench-bar relations that the judges involved in planning courthouse construction did not think to
consult with the private bar. When attorneys sought to change the plans and obtain some space
designated for the private bar, they were essentially told that the plans could not be altered but were
offered the token satisfaction of a small "attorneys' lounge" for the courthouse as a whole.
29. See Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal
Courts, 79 A.B.A. J. 52 (Jan. 1993).
30. Id. at 53.
31. Although circuit judges rightfully claim to be overworked, in my experience trial judges
work even harder and under more adverse conditions, the result of the substantial but not fully
manageable administrative tasks imposed upon them. For example, circuit judges can ensure that
oral argument time limits are adhered to by advocates. Trial judges who took a similarly severe
view in limiting witness testimony would risk reversal and could easily suggest unfairness to a
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In short, the judiciary has tended to see its perspective as the correct one,
often seeming to take the view that it is the only guardian of justice, attempting
to keep the judicial system afloat in an onslaught of case expansion and budget
contraction while fending off the self-interested and harmful efforts of the
practicing bar, unappreciative' litigants, and shallow politicians. Unfortunately,
this attitude of embattlement or lack of empathy for the position of the bar has
affected the rulemaking process as well as the trial conduct process. In return,
the other affected interests have to some extent counterattacked against the
judiciary's traditional hegemony over civil litigation policymaking, a
development most dramatically demonstrated by the Civil Justice Reform Act.32
To be fair, the bench has also on many occasions gone to substantial
lengths to accommodate the interests of the bar. Recently, this was evident in
the work of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, which engaged in extensive
work revising Rule 11 sanctions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
response to complaints from the bar, including a separate call for comments and
hearing on Rule 11 as well as consideration of Rule 11 as part of the package
of proposed amendments currently before the Supreme Court.33
Although these efforts are admirable and proposed Rule 11 on the whole
improves upon current Rule 11,' the entire episode of changing sanctions
practice illustrates the odd quasi-cooperation of bench and bar during the modern
era. Rather than consulting the bar to any significant degree prior to amending
Rule 11, the Advisory Committee during the early 1980s seized upon a
strengthened sanctions rule as the solution to perceived abusive litigation by the
viewingjury. Recent research suggests that trial judges are at least as frustrated as the circuit judges
described by Judge Reinhardt. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: JudicialAdaptations
to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3.
32. But the bar's efforts to countermand or change judicial rules, policies, or administration
have been anything but monolithic or uniform in outcome. On some issues (e.g., proof in
discrimination cases, allowing Rule 68 to become more like the English rule), plaintiffs' and liberal
public interest lawyers have succeeded in stemming the tide. In other areas (such as discovery
reform) defense firms and corporations have achieved considerable success in Congress and the
executive branch, as is evidenced by the CJRA and former Vice-President Quayle's Competitiveness
Council Report. See A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug. 1991).
33. The hard work of the Advisory Committee, including overnight drafting efforts by
Chairman Judge Sam Pointer (N.D. Ala.), is described in Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1992). See also Winter, supra note 13 (Advisory Committee responded
to bar's criticisms of draft discovery rules).
34. However, no rulemaking deed, whether good or ill, goes unpunished. Proposed Amended
Rule 11 has been the subject of considerable criticism. In addition, a competing proposal was
promulgated by several distinguished lawyers and judges. The proposed "Bench-Bar Alternative
Rule I I," which in the main would have returned to something akin to the pre- 1983 version of Rule
11, did not gain any significant support from the Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference
but may have helped to force changes in the initial revised Rule 11.
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bar. Not surprisingly, the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 proved problematic in
application. If all goes smoothly, some of the problems will be assuaged ten
years after the amendment through yet another amendment. This entire exercise
of trial-and-error might have been avoided or at least minimized by better bench-
bar collaboration at the outset. To be sure, judicial activity during the 1990-92
period was quite solicitous of the bar, but it came as a means of making amends
for having first "sprung" the 1983 Rule 11 on the profession, with many judges
exacerbating the situation by misapplying the rule, particularly during the 1984-
88 period.
Although the openness of rulemaking proceedings mandated by the 1988
Judicial Improvements Act3" and the apparent responsiveness of the Advisory
Committee in its 1991 and 1992 hearings reflects significant learning from the
lessons of Rule 11, the overall thrust of other rulemaking activity, such as the
discovery and disclosure rules pending before the Supreme Court, suggests
continuing judicial difficulty in appreciating the effect of the adversary system
and the legal profession in the implementation of rules.
The dedicated judges who have worked on rulemaking probably view my
criticism as unfair. They may be correct, but they certainly seem defensive,
sometimes launching pre-emptive protests with a speed that makes Hamlet's
Ophelia look reluctant. At a recent ALI-ABA program on civil procedure
developments, for example, the program chair volunteered that proposed rules
changes and CJRA plans were not the work of "a bunch of judges sitting around
concocting rules to make life miserable to the bar."36 He described current
rules proposals as resulting from "hearings throughout the country,""' a bit of
hyperbole since there were only hearings in New Orleans, Los Angeles and
Atlanta, one of which (New Orleans) was devoted only to Rule 11. The chair
of the Advisory Committee stressed that there was "about an equal division of
judges and non-judges" on the Advisory Committee, which is accurate but easily
misleading. Rulemaking during the 1980s and 1990s has remained dominated
by judges, with a relative handful of judges being particularly influential.3" At
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). The Act mandates that there be a period of public comment
attending rule changes and provides that Advisory Committee meetings are to be open to the public.
See also Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 861 (1992).
36. Comments of Hon. William W. Schwarzer (N.D. Cal.), Director, Federal Judicial Center
at ALI-ABA Video Law Review, New Directions in Federal Civil Procedure (Jan. 21, 1993).
37. Id.
38. See Tobias, supra note 35, at 862-70 (describing key roles of Advisory Committee Chair
Sam Pointer (N.D. Ala.) and Judge Ralph K. Winter (2d Cir.), who recently was named chair of
the newly constituted Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence). Judge Winter is also
credited with being an influential force in favor of retaining but modifying the current package of
disclosure provisions in the Proposed Amendments to the Rules when the Committee was
considering retreating from the idea in the face of criticism from the bar.
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the three hearings, for example, judges did approximately ninety percent of the
questioning of witnesses.
Although the rulemaking bench at times has prided itself on independence
from the potentially selfish or short-sighted opinions of practicing lawyers,
39
it also shows signs of being stung by the adverse bar and scholarly response to
its work effort. Nonetheless, on the whole, the policy-making judiciary seems
to have a clear idea that lawyers are the primary problem with litigation and that
new rules are necessary to cure the excesses of attorneys.' Although hurt or
annoyed when the bar does not appreciate its efforts, the bench nonetheless
ultimately acts as though essentially nonplussed by bar criticism. In the final
analysis, judicial rulemakers of course know that the bar must conform to the
bench's will unless the bar can obtain the support of Congress."
B. The Bar
America is closing in on having a million lawyers. Regardless of whether
From my observations and discussions with others, it also appears that Magistrate Judge
Wayne D. Brazil (N.D. Cal.), Judge Robert E. Keeton (D. Mass.), Chair of the Judicial Conference
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and Federal Judicial Center Director Judge
William Schwarzer have inordinate influence on the process.
For example, Judge Schwarzer in 1985 wrote an article favoring a revised summary judgment
rule. In 1992, the Advisory Committee recommended a similar change (but the Judicial Conference
declined). See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, Speech to American
Judicature Society (Aug. 1991), in 75 JUDICATURE 161 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). In 1991, Judge
Schwarzer wrote in favor of a disclosure mechanism as a solution to discovery abuse. In 1992, the
Judicial Conference forwarded such a rule to the Supreme Court. In 1992, Judge Schwarzer
recommended changes in Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. See William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shi0ing Offers of
Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (Oct.-Nov. 1992).
According to Advisory Committee Chair Judge Pointer, the Advisory Committee will give Rule 68
changes serious consideration in the near future. See Schwarzer, supra note 36.
39. For'example, Judge Pointer seemed more than a little piqued at the Advisory Committee's
February 19, 1992 Atlanta hearing on the Proposed Amended Rules when a testifying lawyer
asserted that the Committee "can not" sponsor rules changes so unpopular with the bar. "We're not
conducting a plebiscite," replied Judge Pointer, in cold tones that made the witness (and many other
witnesses waiting in the wings) buckle at the knees.
40. See Winter, supra note 13, at 268-71 (criticizing the bar for misreading of Proposed
Amended Rules and misbegotten notions of effective practice).
41. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 385-407 (describing the dominance of Congress, the
Executive, and key "insider" business interests in passing the CJRA despite strong judicial objection;
characterizing Advisory Committee efforts as bending to the views of Sen. Biden and CJRA
supporters rather than offering alternative vision; and finding that the "lack of congressional
responsiveness to the concerns of the judiciary is striking." Id. at 399).
Professor Mullenix, however, has been equally critical of efforts by practicing lawyers to
appeal to Congress in order to thwart Advisory Committee proposals with which they disagree. See
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/2
1993] THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 325
one sees this as an achievement or an embarrassment, the sheer size of the
nation's bar makes generalization difficult. Despite their common professional
training, lawyers appear to differ almost as widely in their views of politics and
government as does the population as a whole.42 Some lawyers favor radical
restructuring of the legal system. For the most part, however, lawyers exhibit
a certain comfort with the status quo that has largely been good to them. But
within the broad range of legal consensus of loyalty to the justice system,
solicitude for human rights, and commitment to fairness and access, the
profession divides substantially over particular proposals for change in the
substantive law. Often this reflects the lawyer's professional loyalties as a
fiduciary. For example, defense counsel may favor caps on damage awards for
pain and suffering while plaintiffs' lawyers oppose such caps. For the most
part, however, lawyers seem less divided over procedural reform issues than
they are over changes in substantive law. For example, in debate over the
proposed pending changes in the discovery rules, both product liability defense
lawyers and plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers tended to oppose the suggested
amendments, a matter discussed at greater length in Part IV.43
Lawyers are among the least popular vocational groups in America, so
much so that they became scapegoats in the past presidential election campaign
with both President George Bush and Vice-President Dan Quayle making high-
profile attacks on the profession. What truly underscored the pariah-like status
of attorneys, however, was the absence of response from anyone other than the
organized bar. Not even Democrats Bill Clinton and Al Gore, two lawyers
whose campaigns received substantial support from the bar, responded to the
criticism. Although the Clinton-Gore tacit "me-too" (but not as much) approach
to lawyer-bashing as a campaign tactic may have been good politics, it spoke
volumes about the practicing bar's lack of support in society at large.
Although much of the attack on lawyers is ridiculously unjustified," like
42. For example, counsel for personal injury plaintiffs, defendants, and insurers differ radically
in their perceptions regarding claims fraud. See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud
Problems and Remedies, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 907, 959-966 (1992) (survey of counsel).
43. Notwithstanding a running plaintiff-defendant debate over whether juries are too generous
with personal injury awards, a cross-section of the profession appears to agree generally on support
for the civil jury and particular suggestions for improving its effectiveness. See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION ON LITIGATION/BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (1992).
44. The attacks are so unjustified that they have alienated some conservative Republican lawyers
who otherwise would have supported the Bush-Quayle ticket but were driven away. See David
Margolick, At the Bar: In Quayle's Home State, a Lawvyer and r-Backer Doesn't Like the
Republican Attacks on the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1992, at B16 (describing rejection of Quayle
by a former supporter over the issue of lawyer-bashing). See also Henry J. Reske, In Defense of
Lawyers: Conservative Judge Challenges Quayle Statistics, 79 A.B.A. J. 33 (1993) (describing a
speech by Second Circuit Judge Roger Miner, a Reagan appointee and conservative previously
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all effective political rhetoric it contains a significant kernel of truth. Lawyers
have to a significant extent been greedy and self-protective in opposing useful
as well as dubious reform efforts. In the modem era of civil rulemaking and
litigation reform, lawyers have also shown short-sightedness in their conduct of
litigation. Lawyers who engage in obstructionist tactics and the like may gain
a short-term advantage in a particular case and may please a client with their
"toughness," but seem not to appreciate that such conduct can only hurt lawyers
in the long run by making litigation overly expensive, time-consuming, and
subject to outcomes owing more to cunning than justice. For example, attorneys
have been overly reluctant to explore the voluntary use of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) methods. '
When called to account for litigation abuse, perpetrators tend quickly to
clothe themselves in lofty rhetoric about the adversary system, zealous
representation of clients, and fiduciary duty. A few references to Queen
Caroline's Case are likely as well.' On occasion, the podium-pounding is
justified. The adversary system is to a large extent rooted in a challenge to
prevailing power,47 embodying the notion that justice will be served best in the
long run when counsel are truly independent from the state and even social
pariahs are given both the right and the tools to contest against prevailing
mentioned as possible Reagan or Bush Supreme Court appointee, criticizing Quayle's attacks on
lawyers, including the Bush Administration's Agenda for Civil Justice Refonn, authored by the
Quayle-headed President's Council on Competitiveness).
45. See Hon. Wayne Brazil, Should Participation in Court Sponsored ADR Programs Be
Mandatory or Voluntary? (Remarks at AALS Panel Discussion, Jan. 7, 1993) (noting that when
forced to try ADR, lawyers are generally pleased with results). Judge Brazil ascribes this in large
part to the competitiveness of the adversary system; lawyers are suspicious of an opponent's
overtures for voluntary ADR, fearing that the opponent is attempting to gain advantage. In my
view, Judge Brazil's observation supports my thesis in Part IV, infra, that discovery will be
improved by greater supervision more than by new rules.
46. Queen Caroline's Case, 2 Brod. and B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820) involved
prosecution of Queen Caroline on a charge of adultery. Her attorney, Lord Henry Brougham, was
perfectly aware that the King and others in power wanted a guilty verdict and would not look kindly
on those who stood in its way. Nonetheless, he stated at one point in the trial that he had only one
duty-zealous representation of the Queen-that must be discharged irrespective of his personal risk:
"An advocate, in the discharge of duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is
his client."
Lord Brougham's assertion of single-minded devotion to the client come-what-may is also
generally regarded as a shrewd trial tactic in that it implied that he might raise as a defense the
King's previous secret marriage to a Roman Catholic, potentially disrupting the country in further
controversy. In any event, the charges against Queen Caroline were dropped. See Russell G.
Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
241, 248 (1992).
47. See Stephen Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497 (1990) (asserting that the adversary system
became popular because it allowed zealous representation of litigants and of causes popular with
society at large but subject to attack by the British hierarchy).
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orthodoxy. So constructed, adversarialism can provide a justification for
opposing unfair court orders, rules, or policies. It may even justify inviting and
taking contempt citations in order to challenge an injustice.
However, in the ordinary case, it is more than a little difficult to
legitimately invoke adversarialism to justify failure to produce requested relevant
documents, "scorched earth" discovery strategies,' coaching witnesses, lack
of preparation for conferences or trial, or the assertion of marginal to frivolous
legal positions. Furthermore, although adversarialism is "hard-wired" into the
American legal ethos, so too is duty to the justice system and society. The
intellectual underpinnings of modem professional responsibility stressed not only
Queen Caroline-like adversarialism but also candor to the court and efforts to
maintain and enhance the integrity of the system. This included efforts to
generally raise public consciousness in pursuit of "civic virtue" and entailed a
responsibility to resist client demands for improper behavior.4 9
Undoubtedly, too many lawyers have misunderstood the adversary system
as some sort of James Bond-like carte blanche for creating mayhem and waste
in litigation, a sort of "license to obstruct, delay, or blackmail." That such
conduct, perhaps sufferable in isolation but daunting in its cumulative effect,
creates additional pressures on judges and the judicial system states but a truism.
What is astonishing is the degree to which lawyers either seem oblivious to this
truth or irresponsible in disregarding it.' Not surprisingly, lawyer misconduct
undermines the bar's overall credibility with the bench, creating something of
a "counselor who cried wolf" problem at rulemaking time. When lawyers recite
the mantra "adversary system" in response to proposed litigation reforms, the
bench is understandably skeptical.
The same effect can often be found in congressional reaction to the bar's
48. Attorney greed and hyper-adversarialism are often intertwined. As I was writing this, an
acquaintance described a recent expert witness deposition in a copyright case, at which the plaintiff
was represented by a senior partner in a large law firm backed by two younger lawyers and a legal
assistant. The account of the expert's testimony left me with the distinct and firm impression that
the four-person, $500-700 per hour deposition team was excessive.
49. See Pearce, supra note 46.
50. As a matter of the black letter law of professional responsibility, extreme lawyer misconduct
is, of course, unethical because under both the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers must act as 'officers of the court," loyal to the justice
system as well as zealous advocates of a client. See Pearce, supra note 46. See also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249 (1991) (stating that the three
core values of modern legal ethics are loyalty to client, confidentiality for client communications,
and candor to the court). When in stark conflict, the "republican" aspects of lawyer ethics generally
prevail over adversarial imperatives. For example, a lawyer's loyalty to a client does not permit him
or her knowingly to assist the client in giving false testimony in order to achieve a better result in
litigation.
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position on litigation reform, but the story is more complicated. During the past
decade or more, the rhetoric of efficiency-reducing disputing costs and delay-
has dominated the debate in Congress as well as the courts." Although
lawyers may generally have low credibility, even before a body like Congress
that is dominated by lawyers, attorneys who invoke the prevailing efficiency
rhetoric virtually atone for the sin of being attorneys. Meanwhile, lawyers
invoking the rhetoric of adversarialism and justice are viewed as protectionists.
For example, hearings on the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act were a veritable
"love feast" between Senate Judiciary Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and
attorneys invoking the efficiency rhetoric consistent with his draft legislation,
while those attempting other themes were given polite listen and little more.52
The final bill, although revised, suggests that Congress saw objecting lawyers,
and judges as well, as crying wolf. 3
C. Litigants, Interest Groups, and Think Tanks
The parties to litigation have also tended to adopt narrow, inconsistent,
self-centered views of the court system, making claims that occasionally ring
true but all too often suffer from the same deficiencies of which they accuse
lawyers and judges. For example, litigants in the abstract complain about high
trial cost, discovery abuse, and so on. In their own cases, however, clients can
take a startlingly obstructionist view toward complying with the opposition's
discovery requests. Similarly, despite abstract concern over high litigation
costs, clients in their own cases tend to err dramatically in favor of incurring the
legal expense necessary to finance maximum investigation, discovery, pretrial
motion practice, and trial combat. The problem can be compounded for
commercial defendants, who commence and defend litigation with both tax
subsidies (the litigation expenses are deductible as ordinary business expenses)
and other people's money (that of shareholders or insurers rather than
management personally). When lobbying for litigation reform, commercial
litigants and their surrogates seem to forget that their own indulgence of and
financing for conduct to which they object helped fuel the perceived problem.
To the extent that the plaintiff's trial bar acts as the surrogate for
noncorporate litigants (a/k/a human beings), the pattern is largely repeated. The
reader of virtually any edition of a trial lawyer's newsletter is routinely treated
to tales of mammoth victory in problematic cases, suggesting to readers that
51. See Brunet, supra note 26.
52. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 385-407 (describing congressional reaction hostile to
witnesses who are lukewarm on the need to revise litigation to increase speed and lower cost with
corresponding hospitality to witnesses who urged greater efficiency in civil litigation).
53. See Lauren Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 115 (1991).
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counsel has indeed "rung the bell" and scored a coup in fee collection. When
these same representatives protest reform efforts in the name of justice for
society's downtrodden, the claims ring a bit hollow.
The commercial client community has also been instrumental in altering the
terms of the litigation reform debate through its early and consistent support for
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in lieu of litigation. ADR, principally
arbitration and mediation but also including hybrids and more trial-like activity
such as private judging, appears to have grown even faster than the civil
caseload of state and federal courts. Not too surprisingly, commercial clients
turned to ADR, particularly arbitration, because it seemed like a means of
getting authoritative decisionmaking faster and cheaper than litigation. In
particular, pretrial expenses were to be greatly reduced since arbitration usually
permits only limited discovery and virtually no significant motion practice, at
least not dispositive motion practice.'
But in applying ADR in practice, many clients have learned to their dismay
that the process remains an adversarial one, with evidence both presented and
slanted by counsel. Although some arbitrators are experts in the subject matter
of a dispute, active questioners, or both, many arbitrators are no more informed
or active than a judge. They also may be considerably more lenient than the
judiciary in permitting extensions of time, thereby delaying arbitration hearings
and stripping the process of its perceived advantage in speed. Occasionally,
arbitrators themselves may be the source of the slowdown. Unlike judges, they
have other jobs, jobs from which they may be unwilling to tear themselves away
for the benefit of disputants. Adversarial to a fault, some attorneys are quick
to take advantage of the situation by making sure that key witnesses are
"unavailable" during the rare times when highly valued arbitrators are ready for
hearing.
In addition, clients have occasionally discovered that for all its cost and
opportunity for strategic behavior, discovery in civil litigation exists for a
reason: sometimes the opposition has control of information and will not
willingly share it. Even where arbitrators order document exchange, the
absence of depositions in arbitration limits each party's ability to ensure that it
has actually received all requested documents and further hinders full
development of non-documentary information through probing of witnesses.
Although skillful counsel can often accomplish this at the arbitration hearing,
54. For additional description of the contrasts between litigation and arbitration, see ROGER S.
HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION §§ 14.3, 14.4 (2d ed. 1992); Edward
Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 84-89 (1992); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259
(1990).
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time constraints and inability to investigate in response to testimony make
arbitration less effective than trial in developing facts. In many cases, of
course, this reduced fact development is more than offset by faster decisions,
lowered expenses, or more reasonable results. In other cases, however,
arbitration may render cheaper but inferior decisions, particularly if some clients
or counsel do not play by the rules. Despite what seem to be the clear tradeoffs
between arbitration and litigation, the business community continues to believe
in ADR with almost religious fervor largely because it is not litigation. Much
of the commercial community appears to reflexively hold the view that anything
is better than litigation. This shallow satisfaction comes at a price.
The substantive policy interest groups that approach litigation issues from
an ideological perspective favoring access to courts, workplace safety, property
rights, free speech, or similar causes generally fare better in the area of public
debate than the more monetarily suspect business and plaintiff's lawyers groups.
Although zealous and occasionally quite successful in fee-shifting litigation,
these groups do not collect the large contingency fees so caricatured in the
public mind. Although political rhetoric has heated to the point that civil rights
and civil liberties groups are now routinely characterized as special interests,
substantive legal organizations nonetheless enjoy at least a better image than the
plaintiffs' personal injury bar.
Nonetheless, these groups, too, have credibility problems. For example,
liberal legal interest groups have tended to oppose the alternative dispute
resolution movement on grounds that the decision-making is inferior,
overlooking the possibility that nonjudicial decision-makers may bring special
expertise to an issue.55 Streamlined disputing may also be preferable to some
parties, even civil rights or constitutional claimants, despite the reduced
opportunity for fact finding and decision according to legal precedent. More
important, some critics of ADR seem to forget that one important tenet of the
adversary system, and of American society generally, is individual party control
of an action. Even bad decisions electing ADR in lieu of litigation are entitled
to respect so long as they are made kndwingly and voluntarily. On the other
side of the political spectrum, many conservative interest groups have their
credibility undermined by large commercial funding and the perception that they
are front groups for big business.
55. For example, commodity exchanges often provide for mandatory arbitration of contract
disputes before either their own tribunals or arbitrators selected under National Grain and Feed
Exchange rules. These arbitrators are typically drawn from the trade and have special experience
in issues related to delay in delivery, substitutability of crops, excuse of performance and other
common issues in such cases. These arbitrators may well render sounder, more predictable
decisions than would a lay jury or federal judge.
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Law schools and public policy think tanks, such as the Brookings
Institution, Rand Corporation, and Heritage Foundation, provide considerable
gusts of fresh air and insight to the debate but also often view litigation reform
with warped perspective. Many of the policy institutes operate expressly in
furtherance of a favored ideology-conservative, liberal, pro-market, pro-
business, pro-labor. Although this does not prevent issuance of counter-intuitive
findings, which tend to gain credibility within the policymaking establishment
and the public because they appear almost as admissions against interest, such
findings are the exception rather than the rule. For the most part, conservative
and pro-business think tanks find litigation in need of serious repair while liberal
or civil rights groups conclude that litigation performs well, at least better than
any of the alternatives suggested by conservative groups. Although law school
scholarship is less likely to stem from a uniform world view due to the diversity
of law school faculty,' individual legal scholars often are stunningly
predictable. When told that a certain professor has written an article on a
certain issue, one can often accurately predict the article's conclusions on the
point before having read it.
But a more serious deficiency than ideological partisanship or pattern often
limits the utility of think tank and law school writings: both groups often seem
uninformed, even blissfully naive, about the actual operation of litigation in an
adversary system. Professors and policy analysts may propose litigation changes
that seem useful in the abstract but doomed to failure in operation. This results
because of a failure to accurately predict how the proposed changes will actually
operate in the hands of lawyers, who hold an economic and professional
incentive to prevail in a dispute rather than to serve as perfect experimental
groups for the law and policy establishment.
The Brookings Institution report, Justice for All,57 which provided the
main impetus for the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act, serves as a telling
illustration. Justice for All argued that increasing costs and delays in civil
litigation so threatened the effectiveness of the American institution of civil
litigation that dramatic countermeasures were in order. Justice suggested
individual delay reduction plans, time limitations on discovery, and increased
case management efforts. For reasons discussed in Part IV, the infatuation with
56. 1 acknowledge that law school faculties do, however, have aggregate profiles that differ
from one another. For example, the typical legal scholarship emanating from George Mason
University is quite different from the prevailing offerings of the State University of New York at
Buffalo. My point, however, is that faculty opinion is not uniform at any law school, even those
generally identified with a particular approach to legal analysis and scholarship.
57. BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION
(1989). But because this report came from a historically liberal think tank, its conservative tone in
favor of reining in litigation was accorded substantial credibility.
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revulsion directed toward discovery as well as the overall "case management and
speed uber alles" tone of Justice seem to me to betray a deep-rooted
underappreciation of the best and worst of American lawyering. 5
Showing its bad side, American adversarialism strategically manipulates the
system, especially when able to take advantage of new, unfamiliar, and untested
rules. Showing its good side, American adversarialism fights to the death for
the client, even in the face of powerful odds. Should the "delay reduction/case
processing" mode be too heavily applied, the procedural breathing room that
allows good adversarialism to press its case becomes too constricted.59 Thus,
the Justice for All/CJRA approach may ironically fail to improve efficiency
while undermining the benefits promoted by unhurried positive adversarialism
that permits counsel to develop facts at length, question witnesses, conduct
investigation, monitor developments in the area,' and contest legal issues in
depth. Although restrained and prudent implementation of the CJRA should not
undermine this activity, many lawyers fear that district courts will over-
efficientize case processing in their zeal to show some progress from their newly
instituted, ambitious delay reduction plans."'
D. Congress and the Executive
For most of the twentieth century, Congress has been a reactive participant
in litigation policymaking, even when holding an influential role. As previously
noted, the mechanics of the Rules Enabling Act mandate that revision of federal
rules begin with the judiciary, with proposed rules ultimately being placed
58. In addition, although the Brookings Institution has traditionally been viewed as a liberal
think tank, the membership of the task force that produced Justice for All was "heavily weighted
with corporate and insurance interests." See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 389 n.42.
59. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982). Although Professor
Resnik has been criticized for overstating her case that overmanagement and disregard of procedural
formality may deprive litigants of rights and discourage fair outcomes, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliott,
Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306 (1986), even critics
largely concede the essential truth of her observation.
60. For example, in the infamous Dalkon Shield litigation, defendant manufacturer A.H. Robins
Co. was initially successful at trial due to its failure to produce incriminating documents. Years
after the controversy first reached court, key facts favorable to plaintiffs emerged. Harried or mass
processing of the cases might well have closed the book on the controversy before the damaging
facts emerged, altering the ultimate result. See generally RICHARD SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW:
THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991); SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT
WAGMEN, LORD'S JUSTICE (1985). Of course, the ultimate Chapter 11 bankruptcy by Robins and
the attendant need to pro-rate claims in accord with the company's resources reveals that eventual
success in litigation is not an unalloyed blessing.
61. For example, even sparsely populated districts with no significant backlog have adopted
delay reduction plans suggestive of crowded, tardy, urban courts. See Carl Tobias, Justice Stays
Civil in Montana, LEGAL TIMES, November 25, 1991, at 20. The District of Montana delay
reduction plan includes mandatory disclosure, limits on depositions, and interrogatories.
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before Congress but slated for adoption unless Congress affirmatively acts to
change or thwart the proposal. The reactive mode has usually governed
litigation reform outside rulemaking as well. Early in the century, Congress
changed the Supreme Court's appellate and certiorari jurisdiction due to the
urging of the justices.'2 In 1988, the High Court's appellate role was
eliminated or made virtually discretionary, again as a result of affirmative efforts
by the Court.' Similarly, Congress tends to wait to hear from the judicial
community regarding vacancies, salary, working conditions and similar issues,
usually reacting in a largely favorable manner so long as the result is not too
costly.
In the past twenty years, however, Congress has increasingly shown more
activism of its own, particularly when dealing with areas of the law where bench
attitudes and action (or inaction) may be affected by self-interest. For example,
former Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) and other non-judges were the primary
forces behind major changes in the judicial disqualification statutes enacted in
1974.' Perhaps unsurprisingly, the bench did not actively pursue a
strengthened, less discretionary disqualification statute. The more recent Biden
Bill reflects a similar congressional desire to reform an area of law in which
Congress appears to view the judiciary as institutionally compromised because
of self-interest. As previously noted, no sitting federal judges were consulted
prior to the Act's introduction. Although some judges participated in hearings
on the bill, they received a moderately chilly reception. In effect, Congress,
particularly Chairman Biden, had determined that swift action was necessary and
that the bench was either too indecisive or insufficiently committed to the goals
of delay and cost reduction. 65 In contrast to the Biden Bill on delay reduction,
the congressionally driven Bayh Bill on disqualification had a less hurried, more
consultative history."
The question, of course, remains as to whether the Biden Bill is merely an
aberration in the normally reactive and cooperative relations of bench and
Congress or evidence of significant evolution in the relationship. I tend to think
62. See Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 (1925); ROBERT STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.1 (5th ed. 1978).
63. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988); Judicial Improvements
Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
64. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 589, 594-96
(1987). The changes brought about by the "Bayh Bill" were in part a response to then-Associate
Justice William H. Rehnquist's controversial decision not to disqualify himself from sitting on a case
involving Nixon Administration policy, with which he was at least peripherally involved prior to
joining the high Court.
65. See Mullenix, supra note 7; Robel, supra note 53, at 115.
66. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 385-407 (criticizing Biden Bill as hurriedly enacted by
special interests without sufficient reflection by Congress).
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the latter, at least concerning litigation reform. The years between the Bayh Bill
and the Biden Bill saw substantial congressional activity to overturn judicial
interpretations of substantive law, particularly in the area of civil rights.67 This
legislation, all of which I support as a matter of personal policy preference for
the law, and which reverses judicial decisions on subjects in which the judiciary
is not obviously self-interested, suggests that Congress has generally become
more attuned to watching the judiciary's performance, at least on matters of
substantive law. As civil rights attorneys know, many of the important issues
that prompted legislation, such as the 1991 Civil Rights Act, were arguably
procedural as well, dealing with issues such as establishment of a jury-triable
claim, proof of discrimination, collateral attack on a consent decree, and the
applicable period of limitations.
In areas of judicial administration and litigation practice, it follows that
Congress would be inclined toward similar scrutiny but with even less deference
to the judiciary.' Although the Biden Bill's aggressively impatient stance
toward the judiciary's cleaning of its own house provides a sharp acceleration
of the process, it can be viewed as but an extension of a modern trend toward
increased legislative activism concerning law and litigation.'
In addition, recent years seem to reflect decreased congressional respect for
the bench. The sentiment was aptly captured in a conversation I had with one
Capitol Hill insider. Although a conscientious advocate of legal reform, he saw
the bench at least as much an enemy as an ally. Commenting on judicial
disgruntlement over the Biden Bill, he dismissed the criticisms, which means,
67. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991), reversed parts of
several Supreme Court decisions: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 493 U.S.
802 (1989); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., I11 S. Ct. 1227 (U.S. 1990); Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
See also The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (Supp. 1989)
(overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); The Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986,20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(4)(B)-(G) (1988) (overturning Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992 (1984)); The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,42 U.S.C. § 1973 (overturning City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (1988) (overturning General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)); The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (overturning Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
68. Congressional overruling of Supreme Court decisions has undoubtedly been fueled in part
by a congressional perception that recent Supreme Court appointees may have assumed office
holding an ideological agenda of curtailing the breadth of U.S. civil rights law. Whether these
factors make the Court's substantive law jurisprudence less credible to Democrats in Congress than
the judiciary's litigation activities generally is a question beyond the scope of this essay.
69. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 376-80 (characterizing the CJRA as an abrupt and major
change in inter-branch relations and court administration generally).
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of course, that he largely dismisses my criticisms of the CJRA set out in this
Essay. He characterized the bench as unhappy unless it has complete control
over judicial policymaking, a goal he sees as illegitimate. "What [federal
judges] forget is that they are only judges. They are not elected policymakers.
Their job is to administer the court system according to the laws made by the
elected policymakers." °  Put a slightly different way, many in and around
Congress think that "court reform [is] a public policy question, not one reserved
to judges and lawyers.""
Senator Biden's former director of the Senate Judiciary Committee staff was
no more diplomatic in his written criticism of the judiciary and support of the
CJRA.Y He drew a distinction between the users of the justice system (the
parties) and the legal profession (bench and bar), viewing the former as
deserving litigants stymied by shortcomings of the bar in trying cases and the
bench in being slow to respond to perceived problems in the litigation system.
In making reforms, primary consideration should be given to "users" rather than
lawyers. This suffers not only from unusual Pollyannaishness about clients and
cynicism about lawyers, but also draws a romantic characterization of Congress
that many observers find inaccurate.
To this former staffer and other proponents of the Biden Bill, the bench and
bar are narrow and self-interested, while Congress responds quickly to
constituents solely on the level of sound policymaking. This vista of legislative
Nirvana must come as quite a shock to persons familiar with the public choice
literature of the past three decades, which largely argues that legislatures are
particularly vulnerable to corruption by interest groups of non-majoritarian but
well-organized voters, supporters, and contributors.' Although these same
arguments logically apply to other public actors such as judges and executive
officials, the need to seek election and re-election in a system dependent on
private fundraising is thought to make legislators particularly vulnerable to
interest group distortion. One commentator strongly implied that this occurred
70. Anonymous interview, December 1992.
71. See Robert W. Kastenmaier & Michael J. Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon to
the Federal Judiciary, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 54, 56
(Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1987).
72. See Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Ovil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1991).
73. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-62 (1991). In addition to this interest group branch of public choice
theory, an "Arrow's Theorem" branch suggests that legislative outcomes are often not precisely
rational because the imperfections of measuring member sentiment and the agenda-setting control
of powerful members (e.g., committee chairs) may result in enactment of some less-favored
legislation while more-favored legislation fails to become law.
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in bringing about enactment of the CJRA.74  Of course, defenders of
congressional hegemony not only reject this view but are equally sure thatjudges
and lawyers constitute the problem.
As with bench-bar relations, however, legislative-judicial relations seem to
be characterized by the weaker party's exceeding deference. Just as lawyers
ultimately bend to judges, judges appear only to be mildly combative with
Congress. With respect to the CJRA, for example, the Judicial Conference
opposed the bill and succeeded in obtaining some revisions. But as soon as the
CJRA became law, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee redoubled its efforts to
bring about discovery changes, including the implementation of a disclosure
system of information exchange, largely as a means of either pre-empting
further congressional action or giving Congress the litigation reform it sought.
To the extent that the cynical view of the judiciary expressed by
congressional insiders is common on Capitol Hill, the implications are troubling.
First, it glosses over possible constitutional difficulties concerning the meaning
of Article III and separation of powers.75 Although judges must indeed
generally apply the laws as written by Congress, limitless deference in the area
for litigation reform would run afoul of the Constitution if it results in the
federal judiciary losing its essential character as a co-equal branch of
government.76 Where the courts are concerned, our tradition is one in which
judges are not merely ministerial implementers but often act legitimately as
policymakers. For example, a law micro-managing federal courts to the extent
of setting time limits on settlement conferences with the judge would seem not
only foolish but unconstitutional. Certainly, therefore, a federal bench vested
with the power of judicial review is entitled to the less drastic prerogative of a
meaningful consultative role in addressing matters of litigation reform. Most
troubling, however, is the "who do they think they are?" tone of some
comments. Although not immune from criticism, judges deserve substantial
respect for both their daily burdens and their historic commitment to improving
the judicial system.
More troubling perhaps than frayed relations between the legislature and the
judiciary is the congressional failure to receive systematic input from the
practicing bar as a whole. To be sure, lawyers in private practice are
represented by interest groups in Washington: the American Bar Association
(ABA); the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA); and similar groups.
74. See Mullenix, supra note 7.
75. See id. at 424-38.
76. In the realm of substantive law, the federal bench obviously cannot defer from exercising
its power of judicial review for cases properly within its jurisdiction. When faced with an
unconstitutional law, the court must prevent its operation.
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These organizations regularly participate in suggesting or commenting upon
changes in the law. But, for the most part, Congress hears only from the
profession's elites. The ABA and other bar associations are traditionally led by
lawyers affiliated with larger, more prestigious law firms that tend to have a
case load and clientele distinct from that of the main street lawyer. These
groups and their representatives may well have idiosyncratic views as to pressing
litigation problems and possible solutions. Yet, to Congress the views of these
spokespersons become the views of the profession. Even ATLA, which styles
itself as the champion of downtrodden personal injury victims, tends to be led
by the most successful and thus wealthiest lawyers, whose personal injury
practices may look nothing like that of a main street lawyer.
Compounding the problem is the recent emergence of possible
overrepresentation of a subgroup of private practitioners. Lawyers for the
insurance industry and product liability defendants have been at the forefront of
the bar's participation in recent litigation policymaking. For example, Aetna
Insurance Company counsel testified in favor of the Biden Bill and appears to
have been closely involved with the Brookings Institution's Justice for All
Report. The product liability defense bar was even more visible in recent
efforts to thwart the proposed Amended Rule 26 on disclosure. Of the nearly
200 written comments received by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, nearly
a fourth appear to have been authored by manufacturer's counsel or product
liability defense counsel. Comments were also offered by their umbrella groups,
the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) and Lawyers for Civil Justice
(LCJ). The great similarity of the comments suggests that ATRA or a group
member authored "form" or suggested comments that were widely followed by
the group's membership.
A narrow picture of the profession can only accentuate a related problem:
the probability that congresspersons and staff do not really have a feel for the
practical aspects of private lawyering. Although most on Capitol Hill are
lawyers, few have had active experience practicing law. Most practiced politics
from the outset even if nominally housed in a law firm.' To the extent that
members appear to have actual litigation experience, my review of their
biographies suggests that this was primarily in criminal law litigation. Without
77. There are, of course, dramatic exceptions. Sen. Howell Heflin (D-Ala.) was a Justice of
the Alabama Supreme Court. Democratic Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Me.) was a federal
district judge and a United States Attorney. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Sen. Arlen Spector (R-
Pa.) were local prosecutors. But see Roger H. Davidson, What Judges Ought to Know About
Lawmaking in Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 90, 92
(Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1987) ("While law remains the most typical postgraduate training for.
senators and representatives, many of them enter elective office early in their careers and therefore
have practiced little or no law.').
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denigrating prosecution experience (ex-defenders appear rarely to reach
Congress), I can only emphasize that this litigation experience does not tell
legislators much about civil litigation issues such as discovery abuse or the net
cost of procedural requirements.' It may, however, account for congressional
receptiveness to modifications in discovery such as disclosure, which appear to
parallel the impact of Brady v. Maryland and the Jencks Act in the criminal
arena.
79
Notwithstanding imperfections, however, Congress has been an active and
constructive force for improving the law, although in my view it has performed
better in areas of substantive law than in litigation procedure. By comparison
to the Executive, however, Congress has been positively platonic. Since 1980,
the policy arm of the Justice Department has reflected the Reagan and Bush
administration priority of enhancing the judicial system for the benefit of
business litigants. This has generally put the Justice Department in alliance with
business in promoting delay and cost reduction, particularly streamlining of
discovery, as the most urgent litigation reform issues.
In 1992, however, the Administration turned positively churlish toward
lawyers and the judicial system through release of the report of the Presidential
Council on Competitiveness chaired by Vice-President Quayle, entitled An
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform. Although it contained many useful and
noncontroversial suggestions (some were already essentially the status quo), the
"Quayle Report" was notable for its anti-lawyer rhetoric and its thin-to-
nonexistent empirical support for its more extreme suggestions: liberal rules of
litigation are a significant drain on the American economy; punitive damages
awards should not exceed the amount of compensatory damages awarded in a
case; and the English Rule in which the losing litigant pays the prevailing party's
legal fees should be adopted. In addition to its problems of perception,
partisanship and accuracy already detailed by others,' the Quayle Report fails
to assess the role of the adversary system in modem American law. To an
extent, the Quayle Report's complaints may be intertwined with adversarialism.
Yet, the Report does not address any attendant need to modify the adversarial
system in order to achieve the efficiency goals the Report purports to seek.
78. To state the obvious: government prosecutors normally do not record billable time, nor
do they charge fees to clients.
79. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), held that the prosecution's refusal to provide
material evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates due process. The Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), provides that any statement or report of a witness in a criminal prosecution
must be produced if it relates to direct examination testimony of that witness. In actual practice,
many prosecutors have a so-called "open file" approach, in which all such data is readily made
available to the defendant unless delay is thought necessary to protect the safety of a witness or the
integrity of an ongoing investigation.
80. See Reske, supra note 44.
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III. FIFTY-SEVEN CHANNELS AND VERY LrrLE ON: THE DISTURBING BUT
CONTINUING INADEQUACY AND IRRELEVANCE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Of course, the Council on Competitiveness was hardly the first law reform
effort unhindered by regard for the facts. Although, to paraphrase noted New
Jersey Supreme Court Justice Arthur Vanderbilt, law reform efforts require
endurance, 8 they historically do not require much in the way of field
investigation, data collection, or systematic case study. Usually, anecdotes and
personal impression suffice so long as they are generally shared by a sufficient
number of allies. As one commentator noted in a different context, "In legal
theory, a little fact goes a long way."82
I realize that in this Essay I also rely heavily on personal experience and
anecdote, but at least I recognize this limitation and restrict the sweep of my
proposals. However, unlike some quarters of the executive branch, Congress,
and the judicial establishment, I lack the hubris to argue for immediate
implementation of major changes in rules, statutes, or litigation practice without
first gathering a modicum of objective empirical support.83 The burden of
persuasion-real, objectively verifiable persuasion through solid case studies,
aggregate empirical data, experimentation, or powerful argument-should rest
upon those who would change the law of procedure. Only where that burden
is well shouldered, perhaps even by a policymaking equivalent of the clear and
convincing evidence standard, should there be changes in the Federal Rules,
revision of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, or the imposition of additional non-
judicial work upon the courts, such as the drafting of expense and delay
reduction plans.
In a sense, I suggest a little more reverence by legal policymakers for
tradition; not traditions of recent vintage such as the 1983 amendments to Rule
11, but to the more venerable traditions of the 1938 Federal Rules and the
common law's tacit commitment to the status quo in the form of a rebuttable
presumption of continuity. Legal policymakers should be a little more like
Edmund Burke and a little less like a modem presidential candidate. They
should adhere to tradition until the case for change is well-made rather than
leaping forth with newly minted, popular for the moment, but untested
proposals.
81. "Judicial reform is not a sport for the short-winded." See ARTHUR VANDERBILT, MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION XIX (1949).
82. David Cole, Against Literalism, 40 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1987) (reviewing JAMES B. WHITE,
HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW (1985)).
83. This self-professed caution does not, however, deter me much from arguing (see text
accompanying notes 100-110, infra) for increases in the size of the federal judicial corps, which
would certainly have a significant price tag.
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I realize that many might dispute this view, asking why the profession
should be wedded to the 1938 Federal Rules and their spirit of open access to
the courts, when to some extent the 1938 Rules were a happy accident stemming
from the vision of Judge Charles Clark and other procedural progressives who
happened to then control the policymaking establishment. My response is
Burkean: regardless of the accidents of history and the initial assignment of
entitlement, we should ordinarily begin from the starting point of the status quo,
even if that status quo is not the one the current political majority might have
chosen. If the new powers of corporate business interests, lawyer-economists,
politicians, and influential contributors and constituents can show that the status
quo is seriously flawed, unfair, or illegitimate, they have made a case for
change. If they show only that the status quo is imperfect, they should be
forced to demonstrate more convincingly the efficacy of any proposed reforms.
In my view, the supporters of the CJRA and substantial discovery rules reform
have made neither case for change. They certainly have not enlisted any
persuasive empirical data in their cause.
For years, scholars have bemoaned the relative dearth of hard data on the
performance of the litigation system," but little changes. For example, more
than five years ago, Professor Laurens Walker succinctly restated the case for
further empirical research, specifically "limited field experiments," which are
more feasible in law than are the true experiments found in the physical
sciences," but little such data has been assembled. However, one silver lining
of the CJRA is its potential for providing such a base of comparing different
approaches. Unfortunately, the sheer nationwide breadth of the CJRA and the
absence of an integrated evaluation process may limit the usefulness of the
variegation of local district court Delay Reduction Plans for future study.8 6
Although some very helpful survey research in litigation has occurred,87
survey data is generally considered less reliable than experimental observation
84. See, e.g., Michael A. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); Peter A. Schuck, Why Don't
Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
85. See Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Erperiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1988).
86. Nonetheless, despite criticisms directed toward it, the CJRA may well have a significant
silver lining should it promote experimentation that is sufficiently well-monitored to enable
policymakers to evaluate various proposals. However, for this to occur, legal policymakers must
permit sufficient time for evaluation. Ever-changing delay reduction plans and substantial
amendments to the Federal Rules during the time of CJRA experimentation may thwart the potential
heuristic value of the CJRA.
87. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Use of Unpublished
Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeal, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 940
(1989).
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because of the perceptual biases of even well-intentioned questionnaire
respondents. For example, the Federal Judicial Center published a number of
studies using either survey questionnaires or collecting data regarding operation
of a rule or method.' However, these works do not set up an experimental
comparison. A study like this in the area of discovery might tell the reader
what has happened in a given district since it adopted a new local rule, but it
does not compare the results of random cases having or lacking the new rule.
I reiterate the oft-made point about the non-empiricism of legal investigation
and policymaking not simply to echo the chorus of pre-existing criticism, but to
focus on the effect of this institutionalized ignorance. Where facts are in short
supply, opinion tends to become evidence. As Friedrich Nietzsche once
remarked, "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies." When
reform efforts begin with assertions rather than serious attempts at studied
analysis of the problem, the process resembles a political caucus more than a
scientific inquiry. To some extent, this is both inevitable and appropriate:
administration of the legal system requires value choices at many junctures. But
value and policy selection cannot help but be improved and perhaps dramatically
altered by better information about the system being governed. Despite this,
serious empirical study seems to be a rarity in litigation reform debate. The
closest the profession has come is the laudable institution of the public comment
and hearing system for the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. Observation of the
Committee's recent activities as well as the Judicial Conference's decision not
to forward a Proposed Amended Rule 56 to the Supreme Court for
consideration89 suggest that judges do in fact listen seriously to many of the
bar's comments. However, the bar's views are hardly the result of detached,
88. See, e.g., ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS & THOMAS WILLGING, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
(1992); PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS:
DISCOVERY (1978).
89. The Proposed Amended Rule 56 purported merely to codify changes in summary judgment
practice stemming from the Supreme Court's important trilogy of 1986 cases: Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and
Matsushita Elec. Ind. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
However, the draft rule also enacted a number of technical requirements governing the making
and format of summary judgment motions that some criticized as more appropriate to local
rulemaking or standing orders than to a national code. In addition, many attorneys argued that a
rule change only to codify case law was unnecessary and held potential for mischief because it would
require interpretation of new language. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL CIVIL RULES (Nov. 22, 1991) (submitted to the Advisory Committee); Testimony
of Assistant Attorney General Stuart Gerson before the Advisory Committee, Atlanta, Georgia (Feb.
19, 1992). Although the Judicial Conference did not issue a formal opinion explaining its rejection
of Proposed Amended Rule 56, it is likely that these types of objections accounted for some of the
hesitancy.
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fact-based inquiry: they result from cumulative personal experience. This data
can be valuable. My point is that it should not be the only or superprimary
source of data used by legal policynakers.
IV. DISCOVERY REFORM: MISPERCEIVING THE PROBLEM,
BUT THUNDERING TOWARD A SOLUTION
Against this backdrop of significant fragmentation and intra-professional
distrust, the rulemaking process has moved with comparative speed toward
making substantial changes in pretrial fact development. Since the 1938 Federal
Civil Rules established the availability of discovery in all civil actions,,° cases
have been marked by widespread discovery activity, a phenomenon increased
through the liberalizing 1970 amendments to the Rules.91  Today, the
prevailing sentiment appears to view current discovery practice as too much of
a good thing, with perceived "discovery abuse" often cited as requiring
reform. 92
The judicial rulemaking establishment had heard the complaints and begun
to move toward revising or restricting discovery when the Biden Bill seemed to
increase the perceived urgency of the problem. Although obviously not a
discovery practice amendment, the 1983 changes in Rule 11 can also be seen as
a response in that they were intended to reduce the number of cases or claims
triggering discovery obligations, and were employed by many judges in lieu of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 to sanction discovery motions and objections
seen as frivolous.n In addition, district courts frequently attempted to rein in
discovery practice through local rules that, among other things, limit the
90. Prior to 1938, a less-comprehensive form of discovery was available in equity actions, but
usually only in the discretion of the court. The prevailing historical view characterizes the 1938
Rules as a dramatic change in the status quo, largely because of liberalized pleading rules and the
institution of discovery. See Stephen Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1986).
91. The 1970 Amendments broadened the scope of relevant discovery inquiry, codifying the
memorable but now oft-criticized phrase that proper discovery included information "relevant to the
subject matter" of the litigation (rather than only claims and defenses) and concluding that discovery
of a matter inadmissable at trial was apt so long as it was "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." In another important development, the 1970 changes in Rule 34
provided that a party requesting relevant documents no longer needed "good cause" to obtain the
documents.
92. See, e.g., Quayle Report, supra note 32; REPORT OF THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 AND THE JUDICIAL
IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990 (Mar. 6 and June 6, 1990); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMIrrEE (1990).
93. Current Proposed Amended Rule 11, pending before the Supreme Court, would reverse this
practice by providing that Rule 37 (and not Rule 11) is the appropriate sanctions rule for discovery
matters.
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presumptive number of interrogatories,' restrict use of interrogatories,95 or
control the order and availability of certain types of interrogatories." As noted
previously, the Biden Bill mandated the adoption by each district court of
expense and delay reduction plans and further encouraged early adoption of such
plans by offering financial assistance to qualifying "Early Implementation
Districts." The Brookings Institution'sJusticefor All report suggested a number
of possible discovery reforms to aid delay reduction, as did other sources. The
swift adoption of the Biden Bill over judicial objection suggested to the bench
that Congress would soon be ready to revise the discovery rules itself if the
rulemaking process failed to act.
Despite the bench's overall opposition to the Biden Bill, some judges
became zealous allies of the delay reduction cause. For example, the Federal
Judicial Center issued a memorandum tojudges regarding suggestions for district
court implementation of Delay Reduction Plans. In addition to suggesting a
disclosure system and presumptive limits on interrogatories and depositions, the
memorandum proposed a presumptive limit of two (yes, that's right; two)
document production requests for each party absent leave of court.
Given the new Zeitgeist, it is not surprising that the Advisory Committee
did act, continuing ahead with pending discovery reforms that had first surfaced
in October 1989 drafts of substantial proposed amendments to Rules 26-37,
which were circulated for informal comment.' 7 At its May 1991 meeting, the
Advisory Committee released a slightly revised version for public comment,
holding hearings in Los Angeles (November 1991) and Atlanta (February 1992).
Afterward, the Committee made significant revisions but affirmed support for
a package of discovery rules amendments that was forwarded to and approved
by the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
94. See, e.g., C.D. Cal. Local Rule 8.21 (allowing a maximum of 30 interrogatories, including
subparts, absent leave of court); S.D. Ohio Local Rule 33.1 (setting forth a presumptive limit of 40
interrogatories).
95. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 46 (b) (providing that other than specified "identification"
interrogatories, interrogatories may only be used at the beginning of a case "if they are a more
practical method of obtaining the information sought than a request for production or a deposition").
96. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 46(c) (requiring that "contention" interrogatories not be
served until the conclusion of other discovery).
97. As I understand the Advisory Committee process, the "informal comment" period involves
the circulation of a draft to persons or organizations from whom the Advisory Committee would like
comment. The potential exclusivity of this list is happily undermined by the traditional Committee
and Judicial Conference practice of providing copies of a draft to any party that requests it and
accepting written comments from anyone sufficiently interested to submit them. Nonetheless, as a
practical matter, many elements of the legal profession are unlikely to find out about a proposed rule
change until the formal public comment period, which is announced in legal publications such as the
federal system case reporters. Even these, of course, are likely to be missed by many practicing
attorneys.
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Procedure as well as the Judicial Conference itself. As of this writing, the
proposed changes are before the Supreme Court, which is expected to, issue
them with little change and refer them to Congress where they would then be
odds-on favorites to become effective, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act."
As of the February 1991 draft, the proposed changes were substantial
indeed: limiting discovery based on cost-benefit analysis; establishing
mandatory disclosure; revising the Rule 26 definition of relevance; expanding
expert witness discovery available without leave of court; increasing the
explanation required when a party claims privilege; creating a presumptive limit
of fifteen interrogatories absent leave of court; creating a presumptive limit on
the number (ten) and length (six hours) of oral depositions; and more explicitly
using a balancing test in having courts determine whether to permit contested
discovery. The Advisory Committee responded to the bar's widespread
opposition to the package by holding to the basically broad "related to the
subject matter of the disputes" relevance standard, increasing the presumptive
limits on interrogatories (to twenty-five) and depositions (ten) (including party
witnesses)," as well as revising the new disclosure regime. Under the
currently pending proposal, the disclosure obligation is triggered only when the
claims at issue have been pleaded "with particularity," a term borrowed from
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and presumably subject to equivalent
interpretation."ro Just as important, trial courts may exempt their cases from
the new disclosure system by local rule.
Even with the opt-out option, mandatory disclosure poses a significant
change in discovery practice. The option was provided in part to avoid rule-
making interference with the recently enacted Biden Bill, which had in effect
98. The material before the Court also includes proposed changes in Rules 1, 4 (including a
new Rule 4.1), 5, 11, 12, 15, 16, 38, 50, 52, 53, 54, 58, 71A, 72, 73, 74, 75 and 76; new
approved forms; and amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 101, 705, and 1101. Many of the changes are
purely technical (e.g., changing "Magistrate" to "Magistrate Judge"), while others are more
substantive and even controversial. Of the nondiscovery changes, the Rule 11 revisions are most
debated. Rule 54 and 58 would broadenjudicial discretion to certify final judgments in cases where
counsel fees remain to be awarded.
99. The Advisory Committee also revised its view on presumptive time limits. Currently,
Proposed Amended Rule 30(d) provides no presumptive time limit for a deposition but specifically
authorizes district courts to adopt such limits by local rule, cautioning against permitting any such
limits to promote unfair tactics by the parties. See supra note 9 regarding other aspects of the
proposed rules.
100. Of course, one of the problems with invoking the Rule 9(b) standard is its existing wide
variance of interpretation. Compare Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding
securities fraud claims made with sufficient particularity) with Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465 (2d
Cir. 1978) (finding insufficient particularity in a case arising out of same subject matter). See also
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
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mandated local district experimentation with delay reduction. Although many
of the districts acting to date have added some type of disclosure mechanism to
their delay reduction plans, other districts have rejected disclosure.'0 ' Rather
than truncate the congressionally mandated experimentation in progress, the
rulemakers established the local option to accommodate the related concerns of
separation of powers and experimentation with new devices while continuing to
press the case for disclosure.
The proposed disclosure mechanism would require that litigants, at the
outset of trial, provide to other parties basic "who, what, where, when"
information related to the case: the identities of persons with knowledge
including the "subjects of the information"; copies of documents or the location
of documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings"; the computation of claimed damages; and copies of insurance
agreements. In addition, closer to trial but at least ninety days before trial,
litigants must disclose considerable information about their expert witnesses,
including a listing of other cases in which the expert has testified. At least thirty
days before trial, litigants must furnish information now commonly subject to
judges' pretrial order requirements: witness information; designation of expert
witness testimony by deposition; appropriate identification of each document.
The required disclosures must be made in writing, signed, and filed with the
court. 1o2
Restricting the disclosure mechanism to only those claims pleaded with
particularity was designed to prevent disclosure from proving unfair in
application to certain parties. In public comments, many defense lawyers,
particularly those who had defended product liability or securities fraud claims,
argued that extremely vague complaints sufficient to survive dismissal could
impose a major disclosure production burden upon a manufacturer where the
plaintiff's claim was based only on conjecture. By requiring particularized
pleading as the trigger for disclosure, the Committee attempted to ensure that
the disclosure burden would only attach to nonfrivolous claims subject to serious
dispute on the merits.
Despite the rulemakers' creditworthy responsiveness to public comments
and their proper respect for a recent legislative enactment, the comparative rush
to promote disclosure as an alternative to discovery (by both judicial and
congressional elements) proceeds from a flawed premise that results from an
underappreciation of the adversary system in practice. The unspoken premise
101. Compare Expense and Delay Reduction Plan for the Eastern District of New York
(adopting disclosure and presumptive limits on use discovery devices) with Expense and Delay
Reduction Plan for the Southern District of New York (rejecting disclosure).
102. See Proposed Amended Rule 26(a).
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behind disclosure posits that counsel and the parties would willingly and
efficiently exchange germane information if only the rules were structured to let
them. Consequently, achieving reduced friction in discovery requires new
rules.' 03
The truth of this premise is highly suspect if not completely wrong. The
premise results in part from a mistaken analysis as to causality. To the
disclosure proponents, the adversarial character of discovery rules foments
excessive combat, resulting in the discovery abuses of both overdiscovery and
unwarranted resistance to discovery. In my view, the causality runs exactly in
the opposite direction: the adversarial nature of litigation makes any procedural
rule vulnerable to strategic behavior. Lawyers want an informational advantage
over their opponents; this desire exists independent of any rules or structures
for development of facts. Consequently, lawyers acting on behalf of their
clients seek more information than warranted by the case or more information
than that to which they are entitled. They may also seek informational
advantages as something of a security blanket that makes for greater confidence
approaching trial or protection against post hoc client complaints should the
litigation not turn out well. This same desire for information advantage will
lead many lawyers to resist sharing even obviously germane information with
opponents.
In my view, lawyers bring this attitude about information to all aspects of
litigation. Thus, the discovery rules are not in themselves inefficient but may
become so when administered by lawyers operating in an adversarial
environment. In short, discovery does not cause problems. Lawyers using
discovery cause problems. As a consequence of their temperament, training,
and the constraints of the adversary system, lawyers tend to err in the direction
of excess discovery for themselves and unwarranted resistance to the discovery
of others. When faced with close choices of accommodation and duty to the
system versus desire for an information edge and duty to zealously represent the
client, most lawyers err in favor of the latter pair of values most of the time.
This is not to say that lawyers never cooperate. On the contrary, they cooperate
whenever it is in their best interests, which is quite a lot. Thus, lawyers
frequently engage in informal exchange of information in order to save expenses
for clients. They may even make tradeoffs not necessary under the prevailing
law in order to obtain a more desired goal, such as cost savings, faster
resolution, stipulations on more important matters, isolation of a key legal issue,
and so on. And to state the obvious, rational lawyers will not engage in
discovery abuse or its derivatives where it will cost them or their clients more
103. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would
Disclosure Be More Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (Dec. 1990-Jan. 1991).
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than it gains. A rational lawyer will not take a significant risk of disbarment,
disgrace, or substantial monetary sanctions unless the payoff from discovery
shenanigans is great indeed. Lawyers operating in an adversary system are not
expected to be saints, but when the system works well there exist acceptable
limits on their capacity to behave as scoundrels."'
In return for accepting the cost of the occasionally less saintly operation of
lawyers, the adversary system nets society certain benefits thought to outweigh
the system's potential for improper behavior: an enhanced opportunity for all
sides of a controversy to be heard; increased vigilance of and resistance to
possible abuses of power, particularly corruption; a sharpened focus on issues
of law and policy by those with the most to gain from resolution of these issues;
and, not least, improved fact development due to the adversaries' self-interest
in ferreting out information. Consequently, the attorney behavior underlying
discovery problems cannot be completely decried. To be sure, abusive behavior
deserves strict sanction. But to a large extent, attorney friction raising discovery
costs and civil litigation delay is an expected cost of doing business under the
adversary system.
Those who assume that a disclosure regime will magically overcome the
traits of the system and attorneys who practice in it are being unrealistic.
Lawyers will try to work the disclosure mechanism just as they have worked the
discovery mechanisms for more than fifty years in order to maximize their
benefits and those flowing to their clients so long as they can do so within the
arguable parameters of the rules. Realistically, they will also knowingly
overstep those boundaries if they think the benefits outweigh the costs. Most
basic rules of cost-benefit analysis and game theory suggest that lawyers will
engage in opportunistic behavior when permitted to do so to their advantage. 5
104. However, these are not perfect limits. One can well imagine a lawyer yielding to the
temptation to destroy a clearly relevant document adverse to a lucrative client where the attorney
feels relatively safe from detection. To exacerbate this problem, lawyers may well miscalculate the
odds of being caught. For example, the document-shredding lawyer may be unaware that a former
employee has retained a photocopy or that the client's CEO is about to have a pang of conscience.
105. See John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 579-92 (1989). On game theory generally,
see ARINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY ]. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE
EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1991); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989); Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 129 (1990).
Litigation has elements of both cooperation and conflict, making both basic cost-benefit
analysis and game theory applicable at different junctures. However, notwithstanding that lawyers
will often assume a cooperative posture toward discovery in order to avoid mutual losses (of money,
credibility with courts, favor of clients, etc.), the adversary system makes competition and suspicion
among litigators sufficiently common that their behavior will often reflect game theory principles.
Faced with uncertainty over a foe's likely conduct, the litigator will take steps to protect his or her
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The key factor is not the existence of rules governing lawyers."° Today,
even without applicable disclosure rules, lawyers frequently cooperate in the
exchange of information in many, perhaps the majority, of cases."°7 However,
where such cooperation is absent under the discovery rules, my posited cause
is not the absence of codified disclosure but rather the higher stakes, greater
uncertainty, or more complex substantive nature of the cases in question. In
these types of cases, lawyers are likely to view the information-gathering
function as proprietary regardless of the text of the applicable rules." Rules
are subject to manipulation by lawyers to the extent that conscience and
opportunity permit. To be kept within the zone of behavior where the pluses of
adversarialism outweigh the minuses, lawyers need referees far more than they
need new rules."'° New rules only provide new opportunities for strategic
behavior, particularly so until authoritative precedent has narrowed the range of
a rule's interpretation."'
interests. Often, this results in excessive discovery or wrongful withholding of information.
106. This is not to say that rules are unimportant. The rule structure helps to define the field
upon which litigators compete. See Ayres, supra note 105, at 1294; Setear, supra note 105, at 579-
87. However, my point is that the operation of the rules in practice, particularly their enforcement,
is key.
In a quite different prescription for the discovery ailment, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank
Easterbrook argues that increased judicial supervision will have negligible impact because the
standards of relevancy are too indeterminate to permit sound, predictable, coherent decisionmaking.
See Hon. Frank Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 640 (1989) ("[S]upervision
by the judge is no panacea . . . ."). However, he also argues that changes in the discovery rules
will be of no avail. In his view, only changes in substantive law or a variant of fee-shifting can
prevent overbroad discovery. Id. at 647.
107. For example, the Eastern District of New York's ongoing Discovery Project found in its
initial surveys that no formal discovery occurred in approximately 60% of the cases. Apparently
in smaller stakes and recurring pattern cases (largely railroad and maritime personal injury in the
E.D.N.Y.), counsel had developed an informal version of disclosure. See Hon. Jack B. Weinstein,
What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear's "The Barrister and the Bomb," 69 B.U. L.
REV. 649, 655 (1989).
108. Accord, Weinstein, supra note 107, at 653-55.
109. See Weinstein, supra note 107, at 650, 653 (arguing that stringent supervision, particularly
by magistrate judges, is effective in preventing discovery abuses of overdiscovery and stonewalling);
E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306,
332-33 (1986). But see Easterbrook, supra note 105, at 640-42 (arguing that trial judge who will
make substantive legal decisions should supervise discovery, that this approach in Northern District
of Illinois works better then magistrate judge supervision in Eastern District of New York but
reiterating that supervision itself has limited utility).
110. The early experience under the disclosure mechanism of the CJRA expense and delay
reduction plan of the Eastern District of New York also reveals another aspect of lawyer culture not
fully appreciated by policymakers: the profession's assimilation of new rules is far from swift or
uniform. According to members of the E.D.N.Y. CJRA Committee monitoring the CJRA Plan,
many lawyers appear completely unaware of the new disclosure rules even though the plan is
distributed to all lawyers who file a complaint. In many other instances, lawyers appear to
misunderstand the intent of the new rules. In others, they appear to be disregarding the rules.
Furthermore, it appears that judges vary widely in the degree to which they require or enforce
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/2
1993] THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 349
By contrast, prompt, available, firm, and predictable enforcement of the
rules is likely to keep adversarial lawyering within acceptable bounds."' The
great failing of proposed discovery reforms is that they provide new rule-matter
without providing any increase in the system's capacity or resolve to enforce
new or existing rules. Increased and improved adjudication of discovery matters
promises far more improvement in the system than rule revision. Strangely,
however, serious efforts to improve discovery adjudication capacity appear
completely absent in the chain of events leading to the pending discovery rules.
One possible explanation is the politics of money. The bench seems to assume,
probably because it has correctly read congressional sentiment, that little or no
support exists for significant increases in the number of judges or judicial
officers. To the extent that this explains the silence, Congress and other
policymakers are being penny-wise and pound-foolish. Although one of the
historical attractions of the adversary system is that it lowers the direct
governmental costs of running a judicial system," 2 the indirect costs of
lawyers fees spent on discovery-related matters (and soon to be spent on
disclosure-related matters) can no longer be ignored. More vigilant policing of
discovery would probably bring a net decrease in litigation costs."3
But to some extent, the problem is one of prioritization. In fact, proposals
for a significant increase in the federal judicial corps are pending in Congress.
Most judges, however, appear to view any additional resources as most urgently
needed to enable increased and improved consideration of more substantive legal
matters such as dispositive pretrial motions and actual trials, as well as increased
compliance with the disclosure mechanism or other aspects of the CJRA plan.
111. I disagree with Judge Easterbrook and others who contend that supervision of discovery
is too hopelessly indeterminant to control the problem. Despite the wide discovery latitude accorded
under the federal rules, most unbiased observers are capable of separating relevant wheat from
excessive or unsupported chaff. For example, lawyers at a deposition often disagree mightily about
relevance or other admissibility questions. However, when the deposition is used at trial, judges cAn
make accurate authoritative rulings quite quickly, rulings that are not challenged or that are affirmed
on appeal. This suggests to me that the ground rules of both evidence and discovery are more
determinant than Easterbrook (who argues for clearer rules, less discretion, and an overall
contraction of law and litigation) acknowledges. However, in the absence of authoritative
decisionmaking, attorneys can find sufficient indeterminacy to avoid consensus or cooperation when
they perceive it to be in their interests.
112. See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (1992).
113. Several authorities have suggested that the federal bench loses its essential quality and
consistency if it expands too greatly. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE (1990). Although this view may have merit in some contexts, it seems misplaced
regarding discovery. For the most part, discovery decisions by courts do not implicate the
substantive concerns over uniform federal law and outcome predictability that animate opposition
to expanding the federal bench. Although the interlocutory nature of discovery orders makes for
less frequent appellate review and consistency resulting from precedent, lawyers become quite aware
of the discovery methodology of the local bench and shape their conduct accordingly.
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case management efforts. In particular, the daunting criminal docket in urban
districts creates substantial demand for more resources directed toward criminal
courtroom proceedings such as trials, plea-related proceedings, and sentencing.
In addition, however, the bench's view of the most pressing priorities may
result from its own preferences. Judges are notorious for their aversion to
taking the time to hear and decide discovery disputes."4  Who can blame
them? Deciding whether Smith's letter to Jones is relevant to Johnson's breach
of contract claim against Olsen takes time and is unlikely to result in judicial
fame, and may play only a minor role in facilitating conclusion of one of the
court's many pending cases. By definition, discovery rulings are nondispositive.
My point, however, is that true discovery reform is indeed not a sport for the
short-winded. By taking discovery seriously, judges will establish an
environment where lawyers are more likely to know the limits of acceptable
discovery conduct and behave accordingly." 5 Within a relatively short time,
even slower or less scrupulous counsel will get the word and conduct discovery
with less friction and its attendant delay, cost, and occasional injustice.
Unfortunately, however, the rulemaking and litigation policy elite seems to
have concluded that judicial resources are better spent on other matters. It has
hitched its hope to the possibility that new, less adversarial rules will
substantially curb discovery excesses. I remain skeptical. Without increased
judicial supervision, there is nothing to suggest that disclosure will operate any
better than discovery. In fact, the limited data available (empirical and
anecdotal) suggests that the basic information likely to comprise the bulk of
disclosure material has not been a large portion of the perceived discovery
problem. "'
I am also particularly leery of the notion that disputes related to any newly
imposed scarcity of resources, such as the presumptive limits on interrogatories
and depositions, will be amicably resolved with less friction than would occur
if judges consistently gave priority to deciding motions to compel, motions for
protective orders, and the like. For example, some proponents of the proposed
114. See Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635 (1989)
(Comment on Seteur); Louis Harris & Assoc., Judge's Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey
of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend At Least Half Their 7Time on General Civil Law, 69
B.U. L. REv. 731 (1989).
115. See Bundy, supra note 112, at 11. "When represented parties seek a ruling from the court
on a non-frivolous contention, the presumptions of party competence and judicial passivity
[underlying the adversary system] would ordinarily seem to dictate that the court should provide that
ruling."
116. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 107; Conversation with Professors Edward Cavanaugh,
Reporter, and Margaret A. Berger, Member, E.D.N.Y. Civil Justice Reform Act Implementation
Committee.
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rules have argued that the presumptive limits on discovery, although clearly
unrealistic for a substantial portion of cases, will achieve efficiencies by forcing
counsel to negotiate over respective permissible discovery rather than incurring
the costs and uncertainty of approaching the court for leave to conduct more
interrogatories and depositions. Although this view has the sophistication of
acknowledging that rules may have their greatest impact by changing informal
behavior rather than being enforced to the letter, it continues the vice of
overlooking the necessity of adequate (swift, well-reasoned, fair, predictable)
rule enforcement if the rule is to have either the informal or formal intended
effect. Without such enforcement, the adversary system, despite its attributes,
encourages lawyer brinkmanship on litigation matters.
Related to the overall error of overlooking the importance of adversarialism
generally is a failure to appreciate litigation asymmetries and the practicing bar's
commitment to taking advantage of them whenever possible. For example, a
plaintiff may sue over allegedly defective merchandise that proves less durable
than the plaintiff thinks necessary for merchantability. After five or six
depositions, plaintiff has zeroed in on defendant's defense: a state-of-the-art
type argument based on alleged limitations in any manufacturer's ability to make
widgets that last longer than those sold to plaintiff. Because of the technical
nature of the defense, plaintiff wishes to depose other manufacturers or persons
with similar knowledge in the area but will soon have exhausted the number of
depositions presumptively allowed under Proposed Amended Rule 30.
Notwithstanding the new ethos of cooperation predicted by the backers of
new Rule 30, many defense counsel will be defiantly uninterested in stipulating
that plaintiff may take additional depositions (of "innocent non-parties," no less)
and will probably oppose plaintiff's motion for court authority to proceed with
more depositions. Although on facts like these the court is likely to permit
further depositions, one is hard-pressed to explain how the civil litigation system
is improved by this exercise, which would have been unnecessary without new
Rule 30."7 Furthermore, in some cases, the court will refuse the additional
discovery, which seems erroneous and may even lead to injustice in the outcome
of the dispute. At a minimum, our hypothetical plaintiff, denied the additional
depositions of "fact" witnesses, would be inclined to place greater reliance on
expert witnesses. But proposed changes in Rule 26 and Federal Rule of
Evidence 705 suggest that rulemakers view much current use of expert witnesses
as problematic and perhaps even a major culprit in fostering inconsistency and
unfairness. To the extent that discovery limits encourage more expert witnesses,
it again becomes hard to see an obvious net benefit from the proposed changes.
117. Under current Rule 30, there could of course be litigation activity on the point. For
example, the defendant could move to limit depositions. Under the facts of the hypothetical,
however, a motion and hearing on the matter seems less likely in such a case under the old rule.
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In addition, even if the transaction costs of current Rules 30 and 33 are
equal to those under new Rules 30 and 33, there is a pronounced shift in the
identity of the parties who will bear those costs. Under the proposed new
regime, more of the transaction costs would fall upon the party seeking
information rather than the party resisting its dissemination. Without doubt,
adoption of such a new rule entails a substantial value choice: the decision to
assist those resisting information dissemination at the expense of those seeking
information. On what basis have rulemakers concluded that more burdens
should be shifted toward those seeking information rather than toward those
opposing it? Nothing in the proposed new rules even implicitly acknowledges
this substantive policy decision, let alone attempts to justify the shift.
Presumably, the rulemakers now think that excess information gathering is a
bigger problem than inadequate development of information."' But neither
possible problem has been well-defined or calculated and no substantive policy
basis has been articulated for making any tradeoff.
Although skeptical, I admit that it remains possible that adoption of
disclosure might bring more benefits than detriments. The proposed discovery
reforms may be subject to the so-called "Hawthorne effect" that often
accompanies adoption of a new system or experiment."1 9 Because a disclosure
mechanism is new, it will probably be more closely watched by judges andmay
be more vigorously policed than has been the discovery system in recent
times. 2 If I am correct, better judicial supervision will improve civil
litigation under any set of rules. By "supervision" I mean attention to the
judging function of hearing and deciding issues rather than the notion of
supervision through case management alone.
Notwithstanding my skepticism, the disclosure mechanism has the obvious
support of a well-respected group of policy analysts and judges, including a few
elected officials. And their position is intellectually defensible as well as
politically dominant. Second Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter argues in support
118. See Winter, supra note 13, at 263-65 (citing excessive discovery and discovery blackmail
as problems but making no mention of the significant problem of lack of disclosure).
119. The Hawthorne effect was identified by researchers who initially set out to measure the
effects of improved lighting on productivity in a General Electric factory in Hawthorne, New York.
Production lines were divided into those with the current lighting (the control group) and those with
better lighting (the experimental group), but all workers apparently realized that they were being
studied. Production shot up on all lines, even those with no better illumination. Researchers
concluded that subjects who know they are under study attempt to impress the observer with a higher
level of performance.
120. Of course, increased attention is not always an unqualified benefit. After the 1983
amendment to Rule 11, some judges began applying the new rule with such a vengeance as to
prompt calls for repeal or revision of the stronger sanctions rule. If the bench gives greater focus
to pretrial fact development because of new discovery and disclosure rules, this will probably aid
litigation but could backfire if the increased activity produces extreme or unsound decisions.
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of the disclosure mechanism as a means for streamlining the already existing
exchange of basic information.' He finds a certain shrillness in lawyers'
arguments against disclosure and he is right. Just as the bench has been overly
blind to its own complicity in the perceived discovery imbroglio, the bar has not
only overlooked its active contribution to the problem but also invoked a
conception of the adversary system that is erroneous or easily capable of being
misunderstood. However, Judge Winter seems to me to have underestimated the
role of adversarialism in the discovery problems he perceives and failed to
recognize that the cure lies in adjudication rather than rule reformation.
Nonetheless, his inability to be moved by the bar's occasional crocodile tears is
understandable.
Many of the bar's comments to the Advisory Committee about disclosure
invoked the adversary system, but in doing so tended to trot out a less appetizing
version of the system. In effect, the comments suggested that disclosure was
wrong because adversarialism entitled lawyers to fight opponents every step of
the way in litigation or that the innate adversarialism of lawyers made them
congenitally incapable of implementing a disclosure system. 22 In my view,
this version of adversarialism is not accurate. Good adversarial lawyering does
not mean fighting like cats and dogs. Fortunately, attorneys are perfectly
capable of avoiding such behavior and implementing a "kinder, gentler" mode
of adversarialism so long as their activities are effectively supervised.
America's adversarial lawyers and its litigation system need more effective
officiating far more than they need changes in the civil rules. This proposition
should be unsurprising. Even lawyers steeped in and operating under an
inquisitorial system remain representatives of clients."2 They will not act as
teammates and may often act in derogation of the rules absent the presence of
121. See Winter, supra note 13.
122. 1 am not entirely sure that the attorneys raising the "adversary system defense" to
disclosure (and I was one of them on behalf of the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York) intended their objections to be interpreted in this manner (the
Federal Courts Committee, for example, sought to make a more sophisticated argument, although
not necessarily the same argument I am now making). However, the objections were not always
well-expressed. More important, the rulemakers appear to have perceived the objections as the
private bar asserting some sort of innate "right to obstruct" grounded in the adversary system.
Obviously, no such prerogative exists, and most attorneys (including those objecting to disclosure)
do not argue that it does.
123. By now it is obvious that I am not a romantic fan of the inquisitorial system any more than
I am an unqualified exponent of adversarialism. Abuses occur under either regime. For example,
despite being in private practice only a short time, I became aware of two instances in which
inquisitorial lawyers appeared to have successfully bribed inquisitorial judges in matters connected
to a case handled (for the non-bribers) by my former law firm. In my more extensive experience
in the adversarial world, I never saw anything close to this degree of corruption.
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the neutral and authoritative magistrate. 2 "
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEMATIC PATH OF INADEQUATE
UNDERSTANDING AND PIECEMEAL REFORM
Although the adversary model of adjudication and non-litigation forms of
dispute resolution continue to have a dominant role in framing American
litigation, there appears to be an emerging view that "hyperadversarialism"-the
rock-'em, sock-'em, Rambo-style of trying cases-has become a combative
luxury society can no longer afford. Without doubt, attitudes of the public and
the profession have evolved in favor of a moderated adversarialism: litigation
is seen more as work than war; duty to the justice system must occasionally
inhibit use of potentially effective tactics; cooperation often yields greater
benefits than unbridled conflict. However, the basic adversary model is far
from dead. It continues to dominate even the common forms of ADR.
Arbitration can be seen as mere stripped-down litigation. Mediation replaces the
judge with a facilitator but the parties still are represented in a bipolar model of
dialogue, making their own cases and decisions. Many authorities suggest that
American norms favoring individualism and distrusting government power
ensure that basic adversarialism will endure" despite calls to emulate the
moderated adversarial or "inquisitorial" systems of others. 6
Continued fealty to basic adversarialism does not, of course, preclude
modification of the litigation system in ways that modify both the procedural
status quo or traditional notions of appropriate attorney behavior. What I object
to is litigation reform that proceeds without self-consciously considering the role
of the adversary system from the perspectives of all affected by it. By making
unrealistic assumptions about the efficacy of Civil Rules changes or failing to
directly modify perceived adversarial excesses, litigation reforms may only
increase the net social cost of litigation while undermining the positive attributes
that result from adversarialism and civil litigation replete with procedural
protections and opportunities to develop the facts at issue.
Before proceeding any further on the overcaffeinated reformist path that has
124. Again, I stress that opponents need not be in perpetual opposition. Lawyers are usually
at least civil with one another and frequently cooperate at least enough to settle cases without
trial-95 % of the time or more according to most estimates. But without the cudgel of the court,
"voluntary" settlement would certainly be reduced. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.I. 950 (1979).
125. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 6.5-6.7 (4th ed. 1992);
STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
LITIGATION (1988).
126. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985).
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dominated the past decade, major actors in the reform drama should at least
make a conscious effort to move beyond atomized views of one another's
concerns. At a minimum, reform initiatives should be temporarily placed on
hold while there occur serious efforts to improve empirical knowledge of the
area. Upon a more comprehensive and fact-based reflection, the legal
profession, or at least those elements that control the litigation reform process,
may well conclude that both litigation mechanics and adversarialism require
serious revision. I am prepared to agree, but only if there follows a systematic
effort to integrate changes in adversarialism with changes in litigation procedure.
For example, if my argument in Part IV of this Essay is correct (that
adversary lawyers conducting discovery need a referee more than they need
additional rules), the solution may be establishment of a large cadre of Article
I "discovery masters" or a sizeable increase in the number of magistrate judges.
Although the first response of most policymakers will be to reject this proposal
as too expensive, sums used to increase the discovery decisionmaking capacity
of the federal courts may well lead to overall social savings by reducing the
counsel fees and other costs associated with less supervised dog-eat-dog
discovery. Unfortunately, the enduring distortion of human cognitive error that
overrates short-term costs and benefits in derogation of the long view probably
makes this type of solution impractical, particularly with Congress gripped in
anti-tax fervor while simultaneously posturing as an agent for efficiency in
changing the judicial system. But proposals like this have no chance of serious
consideration unless the policy leaders of litigation reform attempt
comprehensive decisionmaking sensitive to all elements of the profession and
based on facts rather than wishful supposition.
Perhaps, however, the solution does lie in making attorney conduct of
pretrial litigation less confrontational. Perhaps either serious research or actual
experience will prove me wrong and suggest the wisdom of disclosure, perhaps
even greater disclosure than mandated by Proposed Amended Rule 26. For such
a system to have maximum effect, however, rules of professional conduct and
disciplinary norms should probably be revised to reflect the shift in emphasis
from confrontation and opposition toward cooperation. Without changes in the
law and culture of lawyering, even a modified disclosure system cannot work
well absent vigorous supervision by the bench. Without broader, more open-
minded gestation that appreciates the role of the adversarialism in modem
litigation, reform efforts are doomed to disappointment, if not outright
failure. 12 Effective litigation policy requires basic legal "cultural literacy" and
127. For example, the bar and its client interest groups should generally be consulted earlier
in the civil rules revision process (and in congressional initiatives as well). Under the current
system, a draft proposal with substantial judicial support is put before the bar for public comment
or scheduled for hearing. Even if it finds bar comments persuasive, the Advisory Committee or
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appropriate respect for the diverse roles and perspectives of the participants,
including the much-maligned civil litigator.
Congress may nonetheless be too committed to a proposed draft to make major changes in response
to the public comments. Perhaps earlier input from the bar would bring about completely different
initiatives of reform or lead policymakers to conclude that letting well enough alone is the best
reform.
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THE EDWARD A. SEEGERS LECTURE
The late Edward A. Seegers, a former Chicago attorney, was uncommonly
faithful and generous in his extended support of Valparaiso University. Through
the years he made significant contributions for scholarships and new buildings,
and most recently fully endowed a chair-Valparaiso University's first-in honor
of his father and mother, Louis and Anna Seegers.
Valparaiso University demonstrated in several ways its profound gratitude
to Mr. Seegers. It made him an honorary member of the Alumni Association
and, in 1964, awarded him the Lumen Christi medal. He is one of only
eighteen recipients of the medal since it was first awarded in 1950. Most
recently, the University established the Edward A. Seegers Lectures in his
honor.
Thomas L. Shaffer, Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University,
delivered the inaugural Seegers Lecture in 1983. He was followed by Harold
J. Berman of the Harvard Law School in November 1983. In March 1985, Neil
MacCormick, Regius Professor of Public Law at the University of Edinburgh,
was the third Seegers Lecturer, and was followed, in 1986, by Eugene V.
Rostow, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law and Diplomacy at the National
Defense University in Washington, D.C. QuintinJohnstone, Justus S. Hotchkiss
Professor of Law Emeritus of the Yale Law School, presented the fifth Seegers
Lecture in February 1988. William L. Twining, Quain Professor of
Jurisprudence of University College, London, presented the sixth Seegers
Lecture in April 1989, and Robert S. Summers, William G. McRoberts
Research Professor of the Cornell University Law School, delivered the seventh
Seegers Lecture in 1990. Then, in the spring of 1992, Mark V. Tushnet,
Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, was the eighth
Seegers Lecturer.
The 1992-93 academic year was honored with two Seegers Lectures. In the
fall of 1992, Richard D. Parker, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School,
delivered the ninth Seegers Lecture. The most recent Seegers Lecture was
presented by Alfred W. Meyer, the Louis and Anna Seegers Professor of Law
at Valparaiso University, in March 1993. Because Professor Meyer lectured on
the adjudication versus mediation debate, which is related to the essays in this
issue, his lecture is published here. Professor Parker's lecture will be published
in the third issue of this Volume.
Professor Meyer received his undergraduate degree from Valparaiso
University in 1948. He received a J.D. from Valparaiso University School of
Law in 1950 and an LL.M. from Harvard Law School in 1951. After serving
for three years in the Army Judge Advocate General Corps, he joined the law
faculty at Indiana University-Bloomington, where he taught from 1955 to 1962.
He spent the 1962-63 academic year as a Cardozo Fellow at Columbia Law
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School. He returned to Valparaiso University on the law faculty in September
of 1963, where he has taught ever since. During his tenure at Valparaiso
University, Professor Meyer served as Dean from 1969-1977 and as Interim
Dean during 1982-1983. He was the founding faculty advisor to the Valparaiso
University Law Review. He has been a visiting professor at South Carolina
during 1971-1972, at Stetson during 1978-1979, and New York Law School
during 1983-1984.
At Valparaiso, Professor Meyer teaches Contracts and Commercial Law,
as well as a seminar in Alternative Dispute Resolution.
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